electromagnets of deduction

[exxon]

... I was convinced otherwise.

the machine directive and in particular the safety of the machinery is not something that can be explained (or think you can understand) with some posts on a forum.

You don't even understand it by reading the rules: It is so complex and destroyed that the first impression you have is that it was written by someone who had smoked spoiled stuff.. .

then, reading the various explanations (normally volumes much thicker than the norm and equally expensive...), and rereading for the second, the third, the... n-th time the original document, you start to see the light.

regarding your question about active and passive safety, not always the passive one is the best: depends on the complexity of the two solutions and the associated risk. in poor words is a statistical calculation that takes into account the probability that an event occurs and the severity of its consequences. so much to facilitate things, there are several calculation systems and different interpretations of the results... Nice, right?

Consider that there are professional figures who do this job exclusively.

 

[welcome to the machine]

x Roman lightning ok, I understand what you mean.

I want to deepen this issue of the panic button, because, for a strange combination, in these days, I have to safely put the area, (in fact the volume) inside of a portal manipulator that serves an area of 5 m x 4 m x h 2,2 m. We have built it, so for compliance and certifications I cannot count on the help of a standard robot manufacturer but I am in the middle of what the customer wants: "You don't have to hurt a suicide!" and what I reasonably can do without spending a fortune. within the work volume we move on 3 axes 50 kg of payload and the tool weighs more than double , if I consider the mass of the axis z, which has 1 meter and 20 vertical run, along which it does not move too fast, while instead it moves in x and y also to 1,6 m/sec.
Of course, if someone stays locked inside, the other doesn't see it and shoots and leaves, someone gets hurt a lot. . .

all the solutions of switches interlocked, with keys of personal rearmament entrusted to the individual operators, certified electrostores and what else they convince me little.( " He asked me for the key and lent it to him." .. the panic switch you posted must however be operated by those inside to prevent reboot, but it is ineffective if the other, before closing the doors, has rearmed it. Do I understand? If you give me some reference of the manufacturer I go to read carefully and anyway thank you.

I am orienting myself on the laser scan that controls that there is no one left inside, it costs a little but I have already used it elsewhere and it works, only that, entering inside the machine, you could rise from the floor going up on a part of the equipment inside the work volume and then subtract to the "view" of the laser, which scans only a few cm from the ground.
You will ask me if the car is operated by the mission impossible tom cruise, but unfortunately I must always hypothesize the worst case scenario and, sincerely, climb a little inside the car for, in good faith, go to move something that has transverseed, it is possible. and so you can take away from the sight of the other, who does not see you, closes, puts you in motion and breaks you in two...
How would you do that? Can other friends give a few tips?
I realize that I have gone out of the argument proposed to go0, and I apologize with everyone, but I try to take advantage of it.
If you feel too bad, ignore me, no problem.

 

[exxon]

I think you deserve a thread to se...

 

[francescodue]

@ exxon
thanks for the clarification.
@ welcome to the machine.
in my ignorance I try to give a suggestion: the key system of prisons?
if one enters must remove a key to proceed inside, and only if it relays (to exit) the system is more rearmed. Maybe it's Moroccan, but on paper it looks functional.

 

[welcome to the machine]

x exxon : if I knew how to open it....I would have wanted to take some posts from this thread, e.g. that with the printer's drawing, but I don't know how to do it

 

[welcome to the machine]

x francesco
What do you mean, "to remove a key to proceed inside," a key that's in there somewhere, I'm taking it away in my pocket and I'm going in and as long as I don't put it back there, nothing will happen? Please tell me I understand why I don't want to go to jail. .

 

[welcome to the machine]

I am quite convinced that the "second" system leaves room for objections like:
"It must not be the operator to put in place the protection that, precisely protects it. On the contrary, it must be impossible for him to conduct actions that elude, even involuntarily or for forgetting, the security itself." This will not be quoted in the norms, but it is the prevailing orientation. more or less what, if someone hurts, you will hear from the judge who will then lead you, in prison.. .

I should not be able to enter without removing the key, and this can be done, but I have to keep the key with me to prevent someone from taking it out and re-arming it. it seems, indeed è, absurd, but it can happen: We are there at night doing maintenance, the key is there, in the middle of the tools. The other one takes it, goes to the bathroom half an hour, forget about you that you are still inside, back, closes with the key and puts it back in motion. absurd, in the eyes of any reason, but not impossible.
It's the usual story, banal, of the machine that must be "'idiot proof ". who asks you, or imposes, often does not even know what you are talking about and share in full the post of exxon on the destruction of certain norms, aggravated, sometimes, of the Jew from power of those who want to enforce them.
a last consideration and I close it here, because it is a heavy topic and that I do not love, but now it works like this:
those who produce safety systems go ahead and make the designers more and more advanced technologies available (the laser scanner I mentioned also makes photos and short films of who, possibly, enters the area and causes arrest, recording times and what else...). a lady that you could protect first, for example, with a particular lock, if you want to make it equal today but now there is a new safer diavoleria, it is your responsibility to decide to continue with the lock "so far it was so good " . if something happens that would have been avoidable with a device available only today, you cannot justify saying that you had always done so: you were negligent, because the state of art went on and you did not follow it....

today a modern security system is managed by a small dedicated cpu that, when saving the program that regulates its operation, releases a password not visible, imagine it as closed in a envelope. a copy to you and a copy to the customer to sign and countersign.
After a while something happens and so let's go see if someone touched the sw: who did it had to open the envelope with the pw to access in change to the program , so if I can exhibit my closed envelope , the judge opens it, sees that it does not correspond to the new issued automatically from the system after the change and I am saved: obviously it opened that other. It is clear that it also applies to the contrary: If I touch something, the logic of security is no longer as it had been certified and I find myself in my hand a pw that corresponds to the new one released, so I put my hands on it: guilty!.
You are not obliged to adopt such systems, that nothing leads to active security but only to lawyers, but they are a sign of the paroxysm attention that today gives these aspects.

then give the license to anyone to drive cars that go double the maximum allowed speed on the highway.. .

That's enough. .

 

[francescodue]

@ welcome to the machine.
the key mechanism, as I remember, was conceived in this way: the keys are coupled and not separable; one opens the first door, but to get to the second door you have to close the first. and on the contrary the procedure is the same. You can't have two doors open at once.
related to the problem in question (for what I understand): a key to enter, but to proceed inside, I imagine a protection grid, you have to close the outside door (and made from the inside the system is blocked), then you can open the grid and work in peace.
Of course, if you have an urgent problem, it becomes uncomfortable and if you have a malore... hopefully, on the outside, they planned an emergency opening that blocks half the factory.

 

[Fulvio Romano]

I think you deserve a thread to se...

I answer below, but some good Samaritan (moderator) should move in special threads.

x Roman lightning ok, I understand what you mean.
I want to go through this panic button thing.

Look, I can give you a few tips, but the system needs to be analyzed by an expert. in this forum there is the most experienced of this stuff, but lately it's been a little bit torn.
It seems to me that the approach envisaged by the directive has been completely overturned. the iter is "project - I protect - I inform" and not "I draw something - I find a risk - I put a piece".

I can assure you that all that can come to your mind has already been invented. First of all, you tell me about "manipulator." What rules do you apply? exist norms of type c? is uni en iso 10218 applicable or is it any other stuff? that pl you have to achieve with your security functions?
is the problem during operation or during maintenance? avoiding hurting someone who wants to commit suicide is not possible. What are you doing, padded the columns if one wants to take a test? the concept is to cover the lawful use and incorrect use reasonably predictable. deliberate incorrect use should not be considered, although the demarcation line is often thin.

for multiple accesses there are solutions such as trapped key systems:
View attachment 53846or lockable systems. this protects the operator who performs a correct use. the concept is that those who enter do an operation (extract a key or add a lock) that must then do otherwise to allow the restart of the machine. And as long as all those inside didn't get out, the car is stuck.
the antipanic fungus instead protects the operator who performs a incorrect use reasonably Translations, or enter forgetting the key or lock. at that point you can save life with this button.

However there are so many details to consider. You put an electroserrature, like screwing? You can't use normal screws that anyone can disassemble (and in many cases it would be a reasonably predictable misuse and not a tamper). Do you use fork electrosting? What do you do against low encoding (uni en iso 14199)?

In short, exxon says to open a special thread, I'm gonna throw up the dose saying I doubt I can give you a complete hand even on a special thread. . .

 

[welcome to the machine]

The subject is vast and this is not the right place to explore a different problem. I answer briefly hoping that the good Samaritan will throw me away from another side.
In general the approach can be nothing but:" project - I find a potential risk - I protect - I inform" and I am sure that there are already many systems for the case that arises. I'm sure I'll find it without putting any pieces.
the electrostores, as well as the forks of the microswitches, which I used in the past come with their good screws antisvitamento in the bag and I think it is an indispensable requirement for those who supply them. I no longer use fork for years, replaced with specific sensors with electromagnetic block and individually encoded. sick is one who does them well, but surely there are others.

 

[welcome to the machine]

I wanted to write pilz and I wrote sick... unfortunately "sick transit glory mundi."...

 

[Fulvio Romano]

I wanted to write pilz and I wrote sick... unfortunately "sick transit glory mundi."...

also sick does electrostage. also with block rfid. pilz, schmersal, pizzato, siemens, abb, exist to hundreds of more or less large companies that make good quality safety devices.
often the choice is due to "I have all of this brand, I prefer to unify" more than technical or economic motivations.