the maritime power

[Exatem]

the concept of maritime powerin an economic situation such as the current one, made of containment of expenditure and reduction of costs, the discussion often ends where it is easier than to finish. Many “opinionists” in fact think that the solution of the problem, the panacea of all evil, is to totally eliminate the expense of the military apparatus, useless and anachronistic. is a simple theory, certainly effect, "demagogical", to use a term currently very fashionable.
I often discussed the thing on cad3d pages (and my position is manifested clearly) always trying to clarify the concept of maritime power.
but perhaps I have only limited myself to mentioning it without ever addressing the subject and without trying to represent its importance.
is what I intend to do today and to do so, I will start from an analysis of military spending in the world and in Italy immediately clarifying a concept; We are accustomed to talking about expenditure dedicated to the military sector by comparing the percentages of expenditure devoted from each country to the defence and security sector compared to the pil. so the collective imagination associates with the expense destined to defense the non productivity forgetting, that a part of this contributes in turn to the pil.
In fact, around a barracks, an airport, a naval base, local economic activities have always been developed, the so-called “induced”, that generates work and wealth.
Another misleading element is that if some countries devote 2% of the pil, while Italy stops at 1 %, they spend twice as much of us.
this is not true for the simple reason that you start from different pil. instead of the pil we considered the expense of each citizen, we would discover that in 2011 the Swedes spent 511 € per head against our 469 (cipher that also includes the weapon of the carabinieri) and that the neutral Swiss, that I do not remember own a military marina, has spent only 69 € less than we that we are engaged on the contrary in missions of multinational peace all over the world.

Before embarking on this journey, it seems useful to recall that, in the classical definition, maritime power essentially represents the will of the state (or a coalition of states) to make use of the sea for the protection of its interests, articulating in the ability to transport by sea and in the use of the naval instrument in order to:
• defend their activities and fight against those opponents;
• protect maritime borders, national communities and economic activities wherever they are;
• projecting beyond the horizon its political will to affirm national choices and its prestige.

 

[Exatem]

in a recent statement, the former secretary to American defense bob gates, former secretary of defense with the chairmanship g.w. bush and later, until July 1, 2011, with the obama administration, invited European allies to a greater economic commitment in military investments so as not to entirely depend on the American military apparatus in the management of international crises.
dependence on the United States is a legacy of the Cold War when, before the Soviet threat, Europe almost exclusively counted on the American defence system.
from this context only the great bretagna with its nuclear arsenal were detached and the franch with "force de frappe" that is the shock force represented by nuclear weapons strongly desired by de gaulle to assert its independence from any other country. Excluding these two nations, the rest of Europe has marked its policies for social policies and the "welfare state" at the expense of military investment; waiting for the American intervention in the management of international crises and in the face of terrorism, and then to settle with their own means in the hope of gathering crumbs.
but with the end of the Cold War he uses this situation has become unsustainable from which the will to "get away" from some theatres putting Europeans in front of their responsibilities. This has made it clear that safety is not a product at zero cost and that in order to benefit from it, it is necessary to produce it.
Consequently, they must change military policies and investments even if the economic crisis does not help to identify resources with governments set up on a welfare policy that absorbs enormous resources and redistributes them with client and welfare criteria.
the economic crisis then narrowed more the margin to draw on for investments.
but a study by martin feldstein, an economist who teaches harvard, proposes an old cliché of the Reganian era when the anti urss rhyme was exploited as a driving force for the regrowth of the American economy.

In reality, a nation in order to enjoy economic growth driven by the military sector, must be a technologically developed nation to enjoy the multiplier effect determined by industry investments. this, benign, eliminating inefficiencies and bureaucracy, reorganizing commitments and clarifying once and for all, that it is not possible to maintain at the same time a foreign policy of "high profile" and to economize on military investments.
Europe has tackled the issue of the importance of military investment in a unequal way between individual states, with more willing countries and others, such as Italy spending and allocate modest figures for their military apparatus.
a first step to solve the problem, was the creation of the seae (European section external action) so as to avoid national foreign policies and overcome historical regimes (although with the different conceptions of national defence and security).
for example, France, much more attentive than us to the “grandmother” and strong of the “force de trappe” nuclear, proposed the concept of “europa power” in which to assume a role of leadership to which the great brethren is logically opposed.

whatever vision, reality is much more complex. the level of preparation of the European countries participating in the birth and their capacity for intervention in recent years has greatly reduced. in particular in the period 2001-2009 the staff reduced by 1,2 million units. 2011 budget reduction of more than 6% further reduced the ability of the born to participate in missions in crisis areas. a study of the international business institute, has evidenced that European military spending was only 4.1% of the pil that in the presence of materials easily deteriorable and needy of maintenance and technological updates has determined a stop for the efficiency of the European military instrument. in 2010, during the Lisbon summit, the adoption of a package of measures and weapons equipment was decided to allow the born to face any type of threat: from cyber war to missile defense from possible attacks of "Rogues states" (rogue states). the strategic plan of the management of international crises has been approved and so, in order to ensure greater security of the members of the alliance as well as greater celerity in the approach and management of international crises, the various phases have been outlined and specified that range from crisis prevention to crisis management itself, from stabilization after military intervention to reconstruction.
Moreover, in order to improve the efficiency of the military instrument, a new collaboration has been decided to foster between the countries of the alliance on the basis of the interoperability and specialization that avoids waste of resources and improves allocation of resources based no longer on the basis of national logics but, in the more general context of the alliance.
In this way, European military spending must be assessed not only according to a national perspective but rather, according to the parameters and indications that come from the membership of the above-mentioned countries to the birth whose purpose is to rationalize the armed forces in order to search for the maximum operational advantage, having clear the need for European part to bridge the military gap towards the use.
In this context, there are countries such as France and Great Britain which are the countries that invest more in terms of military research, expanding even more the military gap with other countries.
Despite a reduction in expenditure of 10%, in 2010 the English invested 38.4 billion euros while the franc (and germany) spent 32 billion. the spagna has reduced the spending of 4% coming down to 7,7 billion while Italy has reduced 2% down to 14,3 billion euros.
If we compare these figures to pil, the English are placed at 2.3%; the franc at 1.7%; the germany at 1.8%, Italy at 0.9% and the spanish at 0.7%.
There is an even greater difference if we consider spending for each individual soldier in European countries.
Italy spends 82,000 euros annually compared to the 194,000 of the Great Britain, 136,000 of France, 124,000 of Germany. we analyze the data on pro-capite expenditure. the great brethren spends 617 euros, the france 496, the germany 384.
for 2011 the scissor between use and Europe has been further expanded since in the born are previewed cuts pairs to 300 million euros, -18.2% regarding 2010, from the operating funds that include expenses for fuels, spare parts, training of the staff. in terms of investments for 2011 a budget of 3.454,700 million euros is previewed in which are included also the projects born eurofighter, f35 joint fighter as well as the purchase of helicopters nh 90 and submarines u122.

Let us look at Italian military spending and national defence and security policies adopted by our government, but let us first analyse the defence policy adopted by our country in the last 50 years.
It is evident that in this period we have been based on transatlantic collaboration and the process of European integration, the only chances that allow us to remain clinging to the leaders of security and defence policy.
While we were repairing under the great American umbrella, we have created a strong imbalance between the expenditure items of the military budget in favor of the wage item for 60% of the budget, against 26.5%, for the modernization of military means and, about 12.5% for the training of troops. the causes of such an imbalance are to be sought in the fact that the armed forces have been understood, especially in recent decades, as a vent valve, a social shock absorber necessary to give work to many young people where the offer of work was poor if not non-existent; all this to the detriment of the efficiency and quality of the military instrument. by failing the availability of additional resources, the only way to maintain an efficient military apparatus is the rationalization of the budget by eliminating waste and expense imbalances by pursuing the goal of bringing below 50% expenditure for salaries and increasing to 25% that for the modernization of means and training. this always that you want to maintain a rapid capacity of intervention in the areas of crisis. It is necessary to take into account that under the heading "defense", the safety of the territory is also included (abovement acquitted by the carabinieri) so, by subtracting from the budget the quota destined for, the available figure is reduced further.

We now consider daily costs for individual items.
a frigate of the master class, costs 500/60.000 € per day, the garibaldi 1300.000, a harrier 9.000. every missile transported by an airplane costs 300,000 €. Thus the mission in libia has cost 8 million that sums up to the missions in Afghanistan, in Libyan and in Kosovo, a commitment of 1.5 billion for the first 6 months of 2011.

 

[Exatem]

These figures, said so, will raise objections and will be expected to easy speculation by public opinions but it must be aware that national defence, part of national sovereignty and, security, besides never being at zero cost can never be reached 100% because, as henry kissinger said, “The search for maximum security for your country entails maximum insecurity for neighbouring countries.”but we return to the initial question, why exercise maritime power? for an extremely simple reason, safeguarding trade. In fact, even in the current context, maritime communication routes remain the most advantageous. It can therefore be affirmed that the sea is, from an economic point of view, an irreplaceable good both in terms of trade, and in relation to the possibilities of exploitation of its food or energy resources, forming an important source of nutrition, energy and wealth.
but it is not just economic issues.
the safety of maritime routes is also political stability as it has been emphasized to the “seapower symposium” of venezia during which it has tried to focus attention on the new threats in the marine environment which lends itself to terrorist actions of asymmetric character because of the presence of marine routes “fixes”.
These particular obligated passages present a high degree of risk resulting from their geographical characteristics that makes them vulnerable to piracy and/or terrorism attacks.
for example the strait of hormuz, through which passes the large part of the oil production of the Persian Gulf; the strait of the malac, which allows the handling of oil of the Middle East towards Asian markets; the passage of bab el mandeb that connects the Arab sea and the red sea; the panama channel connecting the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic; the suez channel that connects the red sea to the Mediterranean; the Turkish/bosforum that connect the black sea (and the oil coming from the caspian sea) to the Mediterranean sea that has several nerve points such as the strait of messina, of lane, the mouths of boniface, the strait of gibilterra, the Turks and the suez canal while, in particular for Italy, they are of special importance the lines of supply of natural gas implemented by means of jacks

the need to share information and improve cooperation between states in order to effectively face new threats without, paralyzing the world economy.
the need for:
• build a solid political/legal structure for counteracting operations to new forms of conflict, harmonizing legal systems;
• Relic a real-time data sharing and information system
• improving cooperation in the civil and military sectors of navigation;
• to better develop the potential of military marines, increasing the degree of interoperability in multinational assets.

but for the reasons mentioned above no country, no modern economy can do without the use of the sea and maritime routes without having to suffer serious consequences.
We do not speak of “command of the sea” in military conception, but of geopolitical concept to be exercised between states having a common foreign policy, in the use of the sea for the defense of resources.
In this context it is of fundamental importance the legal aspect to defend national security and sovereignty while respecting the principle of freedom of the seas in force with the Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982. that principle states that a ship in international waters is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. the same convention prevents any state, to interfere in time of peace, with a ship of other flag sailing in international waters. this except where the assumptions that make possible the right to pursue or visit (piracy, slave trafficking, false flag or absence of nationality, serious dangers of pollution, unauthorized transmissions).
These rules guarantee the equality and independence of the different nations in a place without authority such as the high sea and allow the regular flow of maritime traffic.
in the current international geopolitical scenario, the warships must be able to acquire more real data on maritime traffic, so as to discriminate against suspect merchants avoiding that preventive measures assume a generalized character able to adversely affect freedom of navigation effectively countering the new threats.
threats that for modern terrorism, are represented by the so-called "asymmetries" i.e., attacks against targets that lend themselves to actions to "low cost", such as minare crucial knots for marine transport or, use of merchant ships or fishing boats to conduct attacks characterized by an excellent cost-effective relationship and a broad media resonance against for example oil platforms.
In practice, maritime police operations need to improve technological capacity, training, ability to react even with the help of special forces and, above all, the development of common tactics and procedures.
to date in fact, there is no legislation governing the mode of intervention of a warship in configurable situations such as maritime terrorism despite the obvious links between terrorist groups having political objectives and, common criminals dedicated to piracy or the traffic of clandestines, weapons, drugs. the aims of each other, are added to those of others by feeding each other and strengthening each other by making necessary the development of an investigative and international intervention system, with all the imaginable difficulties of the case.
It should not be forgotten that these criminals – through illegal activities – have important economic resources, which allow to acquire tactics and technologies, increasing its degree of versatility and dangerousness (in September 2000 Colombian national police found near bogota, parts of a submarine intended for drug trafficking).
in 2001 and 2002 the Israeli armed forces seized two merchant ships, respectively the “santorini” and the “karine a”, used to illegally introduce weapons into the gaza strip, while in June 2004 it was the turn of the Greek to stop the “baltik sky”, on which a special explosive was found usually used by the terrorist groups of anger. in 2001 a tauro joy was arrested an affiliate of the most famous Islamic terrorist group, hidden in a container with bed and bathroom, directed to halifax with a kit of airport maps and passes.
According to a report by the Norwegian intelligence, the usual famous terrorist organization, owns about 23 merchant ships, some of which can travel oceanic routes, registered under the flag of Liberia, Panama and the island of man.

thanks to these organizations of terror, different are the routes to very high risk and some are very close to us or, we are interested directly as, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Somali coast and all the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, the narrows of the malacca, the Strait of Gibilterra and the Mediterranean with all the terminals of cargo/scaric and the ships from cruise. cruise ships that always represent a trophy field seen the probable high number of victims. today the technology makes available to these groups means without pilot or with pilot “expensable”, with stealth technology, submarines and ships that can be loaded with gas, biological weapons, radioactive and, used for suicide attacks against ports or infrastructure. for this purpose they claim the advanced notification of arrival or, a plan of navigation, before arriving within the thousand nautical miles from the coast uses, with an advance of 24 hours if the port of departure is located within that limit.

also in Europe the problem of maritime safety begins to receive a significant attention for actions both of a repressive and preventive nature, attempting the path of multinational cooperation in the field of intelligence, exchange and sharing in order to identify, counteract and effectively suppress emerging criminous phenomena.
on 23 March last, the foreign ministers of the nations belonging to the naval mission ue enuavfor heralanta extended the same until 2014 as had already made the birth, authorizing actions against the coast somali. It is a political decision that is 4 years behind the resolution 1816 of the UN Security Council.

 

[Exatem]

This does not mean that Europeans are allowed to carry out landing operations but rather to attack pirate deposits and bases even if they are located on the ground, when assaults occur to merchant ships in navigation.
it is in practice to "follow" pirates on the run until inside their shelters hitting the infrastructure and the means.
This is a step ahead of what happened until today with the fleets present in the area that are only limited to escorting the convoys patrolling areas more and more extensive.
The pirates, thanks to the use of "mother dwarves", have extended their range of action and currently threaten the entire Indian ocean to the coasts of oman and Iranians.
the use of the stocks and the teams boarded has allowed to pass from the 49 ships seized in 2010, to 31 of the following year.
you can consider a success even if you did not reduce the risk. In fact, in the first three months of 2012 36 attacks were recorded with the seizure of 6 units and with the capture of 97 crewmen. in April came to 15 ships and 200 men. to this has responded with force in 10 cases and never, a base has attacked on the mainland excluded a bombardment carried out by French and perhaps English. A number of membership attempts have been rejected but such operations have obviously cost.
Consider that the daily cost of a frigate or a European hunt is around €40/60.000 and that the Italian alone spends €50 million a year to keep one ship in the area; a spare team worth 2,500/3,000 € per day for a team of 6 guards (our rifles cost €2,200) to be multiplied by the duration of the crossing of hazardous areas and by the number of ships (about 40,000 annual transits), without talking about indirect expenses (think for example the increase of insurance policies).
an American study calculated in 12 billion dollars the cost of piracy worldwide.

beyond the economic data it is evident that despite the international mobilization, it has not been able to contain the phenomenon that indeed, seems to expand to all 3.000 km of the Somali coast. easy gains with low risks due to excessively "soft" response. Many times the captured pirates must be released because no country you want to hire the burden of processing them. For example, the Danish frigate Absalon captured 17 pirates who had seized and used 18 Iranian hostages as slaves. a few days after the same ship captured 16 more pirates freeing 12 more prisoners. but after keeping them on board for a month and a half, he had to release them because no country in the area was willing to process them.

Now the new decisions of the European Union try to change this situation by resorting to an accurate "map" of the pirate bases, their means, their movements.
if there will be success against piracy, it will be thanks to an aeronal force able to attack with special departments expelled the coves of these criminals by destroying the bands and their means.

 

[numero1]

all very interesting and largely also shareable but.....

In fact, around a barracks, an airport, a naval base, local economic activities have always been developed, the so-called “induced”, that generates work and wealth.

sometimes local communities want, and with strength, close a base.
see from the molin, obviously there are more problems than the advantages.
:smile:
Sorry to break your eggs in the basket:wink:
Hi.

p.s.
I'm not from the area, so I know + or not what everyone knows.

 

[Tequila]

all very interesting and largely also shareable but.....



sometimes local communities want, and with strength, close a base.
see from the molin, obviously there are more problems than the advantages.
:smile:
Sorry to break your eggs in the basket:wink:
Hi.

p.s.
I'm not from the area, so I know + or not what everyone knows.

ok... but from molin to vice is not an Italian installation, it is used to all effects, in it is like being in the states... from what I understood of the thread of exate , we are talking about the maritime power but the Italian "soil", then correct me if I am wrong.

 

[Exatem]

all very interesting and largely also shareable but.....



sometimes local communities want, and with strength, close a base.
see from the molin, obviously there are more problems than the advantages.
:smile:
Sorry to break your eggs in the basket:wink:
Hi.

p.s.
I'm not from the area, so I know + or not what everyone knows.

ok... but from molin to vice is not an Italian installation, it is used to all effects, in it is like being in the states... from what I understood of the thread of exate , we are talking about the maritime power but the Italian "soil", then correct me if I am wrong.

even in Sardinian he did everything to remove the Americans from the base of holy stefano. but since then the economy of the maddalena has been affected by it, said by residents (the tourism lasts 2-3 months a year then bars and restaurants are empty).
here from me they were all very happy when the bulk of the fleet was transferred to taranto and closed the car barracks.
then, however, the houses and the closures of the premises have increased.
what were these activities replaced with?
with nothing...
and we are at 36.2% youth unemployment.

 

[Tequila]

...
then, however, the houses and the closures of the premises have increased.
what were these activities replaced with?
with nothing...
and we are at 36.2% youth unemployment.

same thing that will happen to the molin

 

[numero1]

from what I understood was meant "base" in general, Italian, use, etc.

and yes, I agree with you exa who then increased the homeless, the unemployed etc. but the "problem" exists.

and I do not think it is exclusively Italian, even if we perhaps expand it.
so either there are many auto-lesionists around, or there is lack of information, or both.
or is a simple nimby syndrome...
or still a base actually leads + disadvantages that benefits.
hunting type that lands on your head, or use of impoverished uranium ammunition that does not really please people around, of this last point it is spoken a lot (to wrong or to right) on the military poligon of perdasdefogu.

If you don't want to talk about it, I'll close it here, easy.
greetings

 

[linch]

If I were "Sardinian" I would prefer 4 restaurants to the historical minimum, that the nuclear bombs u.s.s under the butt.
Then the story of "la maddalena" is creepy, maybe it's better not to exhume her.

 

[Exatem]

from what I understood was meant "base" in general, Italian, use, etc.

and yes, I agree with you exa who then increased the homeless, the unemployed etc. but the "problem" exists.

and I do not think it is exclusively Italian, even if we perhaps expand it.
so either there are many auto-lesionists around, or there is lack of information, or both.
or is a simple nimby syndrome...
or still a base actually leads + disadvantages that benefits.
hunting type that lands on your head, or use of impoverished uranium ammunition that does not really please people around, of this last point it is spoken a lot (to wrong or to right) on the military poligon of perdasdefogu.

If you don't want to talk about it, I'll close it here, easy.
greetings

Why do you say he doesn't want to talk about it?
I wrote a post of 4 pages and it cost me time.
Of course I want to talk about it.
but if they start flying insults I close the discussion immediately, this is clear.

that nimby syndrome affects choices is undeniable.
but to listen to everyone should not build highways, railways, ports, hospitals (the ambulances that play... what balls), central.. .
you should not even cultivate the fields seen the abundant, indeed dismayed, use of pesticides, insecticides, hormones, and who knows what else.
in each choice there will be a rate of disagreements, some rightly, others regardless.
My argument was born with the intention of explaining why it is thought necessary to have armed forces.
I repeat, the Swiss spends for this little less than us and is smaller and does not have all the weapons (intensive as bodies) of us. So?

 

[numero1]

Why do you say he doesn't want to talk about it?
I wrote a post of 4 pages and it cost me time.
Of course I want to talk about it.
but if they start flying insults I close the discussion immediately, this is clear.

that nimby syndrome affects choices is undeniable.
but to listen to everyone should not build highways, railways, ports, hospitals (the ambulances that play... what balls), central.. .
you should not even cultivate the fields seen the abundant, indeed dismayed, use of pesticides, insecticides, hormones, and who knows what else.
in each choice there will be a rate of disagreements, some rightly, others regardless.
My argument was born with the intention of explaining why it is thought necessary to have armed forces.
I repeat, the Swiss spends for this little less than us and is smaller and does not have all the weapons (intensive as bodies) of us. So?

Here was the answer I wanted to hear:finger:

regarding the elvetics...... Well each of them is required (by law) to lend every year a tot. of days under the weapons, there is never a complete leave.
at least until a certain age...... You're gonna fix me if I'm wrong.
Moreover the Swiss have a structure, and a training, strictly defensive.
from the end of the Second World War have built km. and km. of tunnels under the mountains that encircle their country, where there is always a minimum number of men ready to enter into action and to block all the passages and estyrants, even with the explosive.
in short they have exploited to the max. the orography of their territory, such galleries, or fortresses, or deposits, however carefully hidden exist, and are visible to a careful observer.
and it goes from itself that they must be kept in full efficiency, not only the material stored there must be periodically passed in maintenance or, in extreme cases replaced.
And in 50 years, they've changed a lot, and you and I know what elvetics mean by efficiency, so I'll let you imagine what the expense could have been.
therefore the fact that the Swiss spends what it spends does not surprise me + so much.

I believe that a country like Italy must have armed forces.
can be improved, or made of savings (especially in time of crisis), but my basic idea is that, we must have a minimum of efficient and ready armed forces.

Hi.

 

[Exatem]

Here was the answer I wanted to hear:finger:

regarding the elvetics...... Well each of them is required (by law) to lend every year a tot. of days under the weapons, there is never a complete leave.
at least until a certain age...... You're gonna fix me if I'm wrong.
Moreover the Swiss have a structure, and a training, strictly defensive.
from the end of the Second World War have built km. and km. of tunnels under the mountains that encircle their country, where there is always a minimum number of men ready to enter into action and to block all the passages and estyrants, even with the explosive.
in short they have exploited to the max. the orography of their territory, such galleries, or fortresses, or deposits, however carefully hidden exist, and are visible to a careful observer.
and it goes from itself that they must be kept in full efficiency, not only the material stored there must be periodically passed in maintenance or, in extreme cases replaced.
And in 50 years, they've changed a lot, and you and I know what elvetics mean by efficiency, so I'll let you imagine what the expense could have been.
therefore the fact that the Swiss spends what it spends does not surprise me + so much.

I believe that a country like Italy must have armed forces.
can be improved, or made of savings (especially in time of crisis), but my basic idea is that, we must have a minimum of efficient and ready armed forces.

Hi.

Well, we have authoritative members of the forum who reside or work in Switzerland and maybe can confirm your words with more information than I do.
you say they have a purely defensive structure.
but also Italy has a defensive structure.
Article 11 of the Constitution (http://www.governo.it/governo/costituzione/principi.html/)
that I still carry, say: art. 11 Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offence to the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes; It allows, under conditions of equality with other states, the limits of sovereignty necessary to a system that assures peace and justice among nations; promotes and promotes international organizations for this purpose.This does not remove that, as I said in the post-introductory to this discussion, national security has a price.
We do not forget that there are unfortunately people who do not hesitate to crash with a boeing against a skyscraper in the name of an ideal.
So we want to eliminate military aviation?
I fully agree with you that the armed forces must necessarily be reconsidered (in economic terms) making them slender and efficient and this can be done for example, changing the percentages of expenditure and bringing them to 50% between salaries and investments and not unbalanced as now in favor of the first.
but I said, the armed forces until recently, were seen as a social shock absorber with all the negative that follows.
Bye.

 

[cacciatorino]

It is not about eliminating fphaas to save. put it in these terms means putting in the mouth of the interlocutor things that he did not say in order to be able to contradict it more easily (as when the former head of government labeled with the magic paroline anyone expressing ideas different from his).

What we are discussing is rebalancing military spending for other purposes.
where does the competitive advantage of nations pass? I think it's more important to have a good education for young people and support for industrial research than a strong military apparatus. Germany and France have an army and a navy so stronger than Italy? I would say no, but what is important in politics and economic power are overclassing us.

 

[Exatem]

It is not about eliminating fphaas to save. put it in these terms means to put in the mouth of the interlocutor things that he did not say to be able to contradict him more easily

I have not put these things in my mouth, but they have declared them spontaneously niki sell it, antonio of pietro, bonelli, marine, mentana... .

Do they have an army and a navy so stronger than Italy? I would say no, but what is important in politics and economic power are overclassing us.

I want to prove that I'm not inventing anything, especially numbers. it's interesting to take a look at the following site:http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/databases/armies/e.aspin the table are given the European nations according to a classification of their military capacities, the expense that dedicate to it and other interesting parameters. only the nations having a fighting value of 1 are reported since those with a lower value have limited capabilities that do not go beyond internal police functions.
Let's take a look in detail starting from the column "land power".
it indicates the total capacity of the armed forces of a country excluding the naval component. this because there are nations like the Swiss who do not have fleets. this despite maintaining a mobilization capacity that reaches the maximum peak of mobilization within 3 days.
We skip the next columns (they are however explained by clicking on it) and jump to the column "bud mil - (military budget in millions of dollars). represents the current annual expenditure of the armed forces of that nation. all nations use accounting systems a bit different for defense expenses. you can see the difference between Italy, great bretagna and france.
the next column "man bud" is the annual cost per man in thousands of dollars. this is an excellent indicator of quantity and, to a lesser extent, of the quality of weapons and equipment.
"afv" (fighting armoured vehicles), indicates the number of tanks, armoured vehicles from transport trumps and other armored vehicles from combat and support. represent the main components of a land offensive.
"aircraft cmbt" are the number of combat aircraft available, including helicopters and armed maritime patrol aircraft. is a good pure power indicator of air force. the quality of the means, of their pilots, of the ground staff are the most important factors to determine the total value of air power.

Now let's go to the sector that concerns me more closely. go to the following link:http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/databases/navy/navalforcesoftheworld.asp#nationthe nations that have a naval force are listed. the figures also include the ships of the Coast Guard having combat ability and the ships from amphibian transport.
"combat value" indicates the fighting value. This value reflects the total quantity and quality of ships and crews including logistic support and basic system.
"% of total" is the percentage of the total combat value of the world that each fleet represents.
"1000 tons" is the tonnage of the combat fleet, in thousands of tons.
"ships" is logically the total number of ships.
"any" is the quality of the crews and equipment for the fleet, taking navy us as reference (100%).

in Europe we are behind great brethren, france, equal to germany (which does not have 8.000 km of coast), just ahead to Turkish, Spanish and Greek as quantity, but we descend below as quality and this, is indicative of the "anziatà" of the fleet and the few resources destined to modernization.

 

[numero1]

Well, we have authoritative members of the forum who reside or work in Switzerland and maybe can confirm your words with more information than I do.
you say they have a purely defensive structure.
but also Italy has a defensive structure.
Article 11 of the Constitution (http://www.governo.it/governo/costituzione/principi.html/)
that I still carry, say: art. 11 Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offence to the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes; It allows, under conditions of equality with other states, the limits of sovereignty necessary to a system that assures peace and justice among nations; promotes and promotes international organizations for this purpose.This does not remove that, as I said in the post-introductory to this discussion, national security has a price.
We do not forget that there are unfortunately people who do not hesitate to crash with a boeing against a skyscraper in the name of an ideal.
So we want to eliminate military aviation?
I fully agree with you that the armed forces must necessarily be reconsidered (in economic terms) making them slender and efficient and this can be done for example, changing the percentages of expenditure and bringing them to 50% between salaries and investments and not unbalanced as now in favor of the first.
but I said, the armed forces until recently, were seen as a social shock absorber with all the negative that follows.
Bye.

but look at the information you can see here:http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/ridotto_nazionaleand above all here:http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/operazione_tannenbaumif what they write is accurate only in 2011 this modernization work stopped ....
and it's still just a small part, from what I knew.
also here:http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/esercito_svizzeroread:
"After 1933, when adolf hitler came to power, to contribute to the costs of the rearmament, the Swiss people signed a national defence loan of CHF 235 million in 1936. "
We are waiting for news from our Swiss ....:biggrin:

For the rest I agree with what you say, the only serious fear I have is that by cutting the salaries of the soldiers, to avoid the unbalance of which you speak, and thus losing the function of social shock then who will do the soldier?
in short there will be a crisis of vocations, attention I didn't say that it's not fair to take that unbalance, I'm just speculating what might happen.
Hi.

 

[Exatem]

maritime power 2We return to the maritime power whose purpose, as we have explained, is the control of maritime communications. So the question we have to ask is: “What are maritime communications for? Why do we want to control them? ”roma developed and expanded into the greatest empire of history; He colonized the coasts of the world then known thus spreading his civilization. the Romans were the first to achieve and exercise maritime power over the entire Mediterranean basin. they imposed control and laws transforming that bellicose sea, a quiet internal "lake" of life, commercial traffic and, of all kinds of other marine activities. the Romans used little time to understand that their safety was strictly dependent on the possibility of navigating and ensuring the influx of vital supplies and that for this reason, it was necessary to acquire and maintain control of the seas. the marine power therefore represented for a necessity, as emphasized by the celeberrimo "navigare necesse est" of grape swan. the strategic results that achieved, under the perspective of the marine power, are unequivocal.
the term “sea power” is very used, often abused, and it is easy to confuse it with the “ship power”. for those who take care of the subject the classical reference is constituted by the works of the American admiral alfred tayer mahan who, at the end of the xix, century wrote the treaty "influence of sea power upon history 1660- 1783". officer of the United States Navy was professor and strategist at the war college. while not offering an exact definition of maritime power, he analyzed its effects on the conduct of wars. mahan highlighted how maritime power, obtained through naval power (there is the difference), consists in the “control of the sea” i.e., in the control of maritime communications. the control of communications is obtained by the “projection of power” that a state, with the fleet, exercises outside its borders.
Rear Admiral Mahan underlined how one nation could win over another by destroying the fleet and strangling trades through a naval blockade. On the other hand, the weakest fleet could avoid confrontation by remaining a constant threat (the concept of “fleet in being”), preventing them from attacking merchant traffic.
second mahan was the control of the seas to allow a country of 8 million inhabitants (inhilterra) to bend the powerful franc of kings xiv, a country of 20 million inhabitants.
to the industrial revolution having control of maritime communications meant having control of world trade which, in turn, was a source of enormous gains. most of this trade happened between the colonies and the mother homeland and was a monopoly of Dutch before and, land after. much of the Portuguese gold obtained in brazil ended in amsterdam banks. and this uninterrupted flow of money, continued even during any conflicts, allowing governments to finance allied armies on the continent (the “pit system”).
William pitt (called “the young man” to distinguish him from his father, also an English politician), was one of the greatest prime minister that the great Brittany remembers. his extraordinary political ability allowed to carry out those reforms of the state that allowed the great brethren not to succumb to Napoleon.
one of the most important works of Pitt was the reorganization of public debt after the finances were bleed out by the American revolution. Subsequently, the war against France proved extremely costly and pitt was forced to protect the golden reserves of the country by preventing the exchange of banknotes and gold and introducing a tax on income to counterbalance the minor indirect income resulting from the least commercial maritime traffic. he elaborated the so-called “ pitt system” that consisted in blocking the opposing fleet in the ports and possibly defeating it if he had attempted some fates, subsidizing thanks to the profits of the trade allies, exploiting the naval forces to attack and occupy the remaining enemy possessions isolated from the motherland. but the maritime power could have influence on the outcome of the war only if this lasted a sufficient time to make the economic consequences weigh. when allied armies failed their support, as in the American independence war, British maritime power could not prevent defeat.
until 1815 the British naval power was such that no nation in the world could hope to counter its supremacy both in number of ships, and in experience. not even the advent of steam propulsion, iron hulls, armor, retaliation cannons, perforating and disruptive bullets, managed to rebalance the relationship of forces and English power almost undisturbed by being able to count also on a cutting edge industry. being a very strong colonial nation had its advantages. It must be considered that at that time it was quite rare for a nation to be able to afford at the same time a great marina and a powerful army. the expenses to be incurred for the maintenance of imposing terrestrial forces were in fact unproductive, while the marina was extremely profitable and the naval shipments paid back the financiers with returns of 200-300% thanks to the prey, the trade, the opening of new markets. the advantage then of being an island allowed to limit to the minimum the terrestrial forces at home while those in the colonies, were generally self-sufficient being able to exploit the local resources. the investment for the conquest of new colonies made much more than was spent for the maintenance of a large fleet.
it was well known that a well trained and well commanded army, even if lower and forced to a defensive war, can to the long run the opponent and then defeat him. but in the sea this is not possible, you can not stand “on the defensive”, it is not possible to leave to the enemy the use of the sea that is precisely the purpose of the marine war. who is superior in the sea has the almost absolute certainty of the final victory, and even if he can suffer episodes defeated, in the end the victory will not escape him.
in any case the great naval battle was not the main purpose of the British strategy. the block led to the same results of defeat with fewer risks. the famous battle of trafalgar occurred only because the French fleet of toulon managed to evade the block and to take the sea.
then at the time the problem of all the marines (and especially of the French one), was like to beat a higher fleet numerically and tactically. will be the progress of naval technique to suggest a probable solution with a particular weapon, the torpedo. this new innovative weapon, with a limited range of action, needed an agile and fast “vector”, able to approach as much as possible to the goal and then hit it. but small dimensions mean small autonomy and poor hold to the sea limiting the range of action of these new units to the defense of the coasts possibly in night actions. the financial problem derived from having to build numerous coastal defense units and the operating one, was resolved by the franc with the so-called “jeune école” of the aube admiral. speed and small dimensions were the characteristic elements of the “torpediniera” that took shape on the drawing tables of technical studies. units from the low cost that built in large numbers, would attack the enemy armored fleet with the new deadly weapon, the torpedo.

 

[Exatem]

British supremacy lasted until 1815. from there at the end of the century, the first signs of a certain decadence began to appear. two very important facts in fact, to which at the moment it was not given the necessary importance, changed the cards at the table: the appearance of two new extra-European powers on the world theatre, uses it and Japan and, the industrial development that had modified the influence of the marine power reducing the advantages that the marine traffic derived from simple commerce.
On the other hand, the transport of raw materials and artifacts to and from industrialized countries had taken enormous importance. the real importance of this traffic was not in the simple economic gain, as in the need to ensure a constant flow of materials for production and export. industrial development could progress even without adequate maritime power but maintained the damocles sword of the latter.
This led the Germany to the naval rearmament.
the German industry, which became the most powerful in Europe, could not delegate the protection of its traffic to the British fleet. Thus a race of armaments was opened that affected the sea of the north with the germany, the Mediterranean with the france, the extreme east with the japan and the Atlantic with the use.
but keeping the world under control was now impossible for the small island. in 1902 the great brethren ceded the eastern waters to the Japanese and the Mediterranean to the france (friendly body, 1904). in practice, even without official treaties, the Atlantic also passed to the Americans. industrialization made germany, the United States powerful and the Japan that was needed to ensure free transit of raw materials and export of industrial products. with the protected industries the race to the colonies became the race to supply raw materials and to control strategic points for traffic. the United States, secured the borders first to the north and then to the south with the Mexican war, could begin to build a military navy to which the burdensome task was to control both the oceans, especially after the opening of the panama channel. for this reason there was a war with the sword for the independence of Cuba (which gained independence from the sword but became dependent on the use), and the taking of the Filipinos. the scenario that had until then played a leading role in the land, now saw America in its place. a further advantage was that the United States did not need colonies as they had a territory rich in all the raw materials they needed (to make the idea, in 1913 the British industrial power was worth 127.2, the German one 137.7 and the American one 298.1).
despite the great brethren still possessed its immense empire and had been the first industrial power, had been overcome by the German and the United States. the war had become industrial in the sense that not only it was necessary to produce weapons (necessary therefore of raw materials), but it was also necessary to transport them together with men, in the various theaters of war. and to fight the soldier had to be supplied. So the first battle to win was in the oceans.
with this, one does not want to assert that the marine power is the only element that allows to win the wars, but to confuse the marine power with the terrestrial or air power, is not correct. the comparison must never be done with naval power. the marine power in fact, not only concerns the military forces, as instead for the other two, but depends directly on the "economic structure" of the state. the “pit system” had clearly identified what were the elements necessary to maintain control of the oceans.
1) Battleships do not exercise control of the sea but ensure it.
2) control is carried out by cruisers
3) it is not necessary to prevent all enemy ships from taking the sea, but it is essential to prevent its fleet from interfering in the operations of the cruisers.
the difference between domain and control of the sea, is all here. domination means absolute supremacy practically impossible to obtain. the control guarantees that communications, even if threatened, will still be kept open for us and prevented the opponent.
if the optimal use of maritime power was the result of historical experiences, just as it could not be said about air power. the use of this new medium in the Second World War was derived from theories not historically proven for which its role was mainly tactical. In fact, in the strategic field obtained little results when it was used to hit industrial installations as the U.S. army air force did. On the other hand, he was guilty of the destruction of entire cities and the death of thousands of citizens when it was used for urban bombardment as the first daily bombing by the raf cost an excessively high price in terms of men and means for which he decided to go to the night bombings. but not being able to select the objectives like the factories, the tactics of the “area bombing” were developed. indiscriminately affect the cities to strike the morale of the populations as theorized by douhet. Lubecca, beautiful and ancient city, was chosen by Marshal Harris because “constructed more like a trap for fire than as a human habitat.” so what point of aim was chosen the cathedral of the xxii century which was hit in full. the fire burned from one head to another lubecca but despite the destruction, the city resumed its industrial production. of the bombings on the cities German industrial production did not suffer at all. Central Europe continued to be destroyed while German industrial production increased. “fast and safe tour” wrote harris a churchill on 17 June 1942, “It is imperative to focus our airpower against the most vulnerable points of the enemy”I mean, churches, houses, hospitals...
In fact, during the conflict, the aircraft allowed a high number of infantry landings carried by ships. the plane allowed to destroy defenses, cut communications, stop supplies. air power failed to eliminate maritime power or naval power but provided a means that increased its potential to dismeasure. thanks to the plane, the ships can now intervene on any coast of the planet and the maximum expression of naval power is that of the United States. but if the naval power is unsurpassed and unsurpassed, the same cannot be said of the maritime power. during the Gulf War, Americans realized that they lacked an essential component, the merchant navy. while having had at disposal 5 months to displace on the Saudi territory, although having at disposal all the fuel they needed, although having at disposal all the aerial bases of the peninsula, the huge problem to overcome was the marine transport of men and means for 14.000 miles. together with the combating units, 5.8 million cubic meters of equipment were moved, that is, how transportable from 38 ro-ro ships. 15 foreign ships were chartered in addition to other 40 already chartered in addition to the available merchants of the ready reserve force.
to conclude it can be affirmed that the maritime power is still indispensable for the progress of nations also and above all, in time of peace. the naval power, that is the military branch of the marine power, still presents the characteristic that has had over the centuries with more than a possibility of intervention than the past. a country can be submissive with violence but can be destroyed economically by cutting the supplies of raw materials, interrupting trade, excluding it from the nous of industrialized countries, marginalizing it from international politics because the "weight" of a country is not only measured by its economic-financial capabilities, but also by the possibility of contributing to the construction of the international system.