tecnico_plast
Guest
but then why not settle (costs aside).
the question would be: can you compete with an ef2000, a rafale, a f16, a f18, a su35?
Is it equal, higher or less than these planes?
the question would be: can you compete with an ef2000, a rafale, a f16, a f18, a su35?
Is it equal, higher or less than these planes?
Er Presidente
Guest
These "normal" problems of "identity" would be naive to think that such a complex object has no "nories" of this type.
It's happened and it's still going to happen that aircraft fleets are grounded waiting to be subjected to change, the problem is another.
if the "client" is willing to solve the problem, screams and strepita, puts down the fleet and "creates" a situation economically advantage from which to "treat" the solution.
If, however, the customer is little "collaborative" then we could create the conditions to make the "problem" unsolved and to "build" the excuse to land not the fleet but the whole project.
If the "politics" can't wait to get rid of the problem and the "enturage" rhymes you against you find yourself crucified and let you close, literally.
the "bustarelle" in certain countries "help", but if you betray the expectations revenge can be very bitter.
Er Presidente
Guest
The problem is not what we will do, but what the Marines will do to the American Navy, if they "molate" them first we always stay with the six specimens, but on the paper and the museum we will have to send the simulacrums.
Er Presidente
Guest
Let's say that the "scuse" is that the f-35 is not hunted for aerial superiority and therefore the "real" fighters would suffer them a lot, the problem is precisely this, it's been "stripped" and it costs like a real multi-role that would have to compete with the f-22 (Let's move!) and then find us with a supersonic harrier? Can I understand if it had cost as a f-16 to the times, declared a "light" hunting and intended to make "marketing", but how is it possible to do marketing with an object that costs (we hope) as a f-22 and in air-show still flies as a bound flying prototype?
Exatem
Guest
I want to put you on "close"... you are the new defense minister and on the table of your desk you have the proposals of some companies to satisfy the necessary update of the national air fleet. It doesn't have unlimited possibilities but I don't want you to put budget constraints.
we say that we need an aerial component for the cauliur (mm), the replacement of tornadoes (am) and a hunting "as you must". for training I would stay on m346 but if you have to suggest... .
I think that a total of about 150 aircraft should be in defense expectations. for the mm I would uniform the line with the garibaldi then or all av8, or all f35, or all that you want.
to you the shopping list...
marcof
Guest
the fact is that the defense minister could be the first imbecile passing through the corridors of some party (don't make me name names) and I don't want to believe that he is doing "expenses" with in front of the catalogs of lokheed martin or boeing.I want to put you on "close"... you are the new defense minister and on the table of your desk you have the proposals of some companies to satisfy the necessary update of the national air fleet. It doesn't have unlimited possibilities but I don't want you to put budget constraints.
(cut)
to you the shopping list...
those who say "comprehens that" are the only competent to do so, that is the military leadership of the various weapons.
that behind there may be international political interests I believe it is fuor of doubt, but no one can convince me that if the boeing proposed to the defense ministry as a transporting troops a balloon the summits of the air force would be silent and good, so it seems clear to me that our military leaders are able to understand that a balloon is not exactly the best means but they are not able to do it for the f35 stars. . .
that the f35 turned out to be a technical failure and therefore financial depends on incorrect technical evaluations and the acceptance of modifications to the original project that altered the characteristics that were believed to be manageable. the incorrect evaluations and acceptance of changes or even the request of those modifications made them aeronautical and marine (respective of the various countries participating in the project), not the ministers of the defense.
Sailing and aeronautical have made us likely to buy at least six to hold as a stop and would do well to start taking their responsibilities.
possible that from the pentagon, u.s.a.f. and marines have arrived vagonate of complaints on the f35 and here from us, from who will have to use them hollow sti of planes, all quiet?
Exatem
Guest
apart from the fact that the appointment of the president to minister, who does not want to be a degradation, is only a pretext to give him a wallet and a white sheet and to take away the curiosity to see how he would manage the national defensive plane, it is not entirely true that the choices are at the exclusive docking of the military leadership. read my post on political paternity of f35. you will see that from prodi on the list is long and well supplied.
unfortunately the times of blessed brin...
unfortunately the times of blessed brin...
Er Presidente
Guest
If I were the minister first I would try to coordinate with whom I should then share defense strategies, spanish, germany, austria etc. Second, replacing tornadoes is a suicide, you should think of a midlife update according to Germans and English...(I suspect by call from superiors) 
Last edited:
Exatem
Guest
You see how you write that you've got your breath on your neck. . .If I were the minister first I would try to coordinate with whom I should then share the defense, sword, grrmania, austria etc. Second, replacing tornadoes is a suicide, you should think of a midlife update according to German edition...(I suspect by call from superiors)
but don't turn around... make the shopping list.
Er Presidente
Guest
I repeat the speech, with the "updated" tornado (avionica, weapon system) and the eurofighter in full service what would it serve? an economic plane to use for the "sporty" work, that for which the tornado costs too much and that for which the efa is not "cut" (it would be better to understand why the efa is cut, but now the frittata is made).If I were the minister first I would try to coordinate with whom I should then share defense strategies, spanish, germany, austria etc. Second, replacing tornadoes is a suicide, you should think of a midlife update according to Germans and English...(I suspect by call from superiors)
the optimal choice, the best would be the gripen, a true multi-role in the sense of advanced and still valid "everything" for a few decades, otherwise the blasoned f/a-18 that could overlap also on many missions of tornado and efa, which would not be exactly harm.
the updated tornadoes would be few (cell life) and however valid for some lustrum, using them "parsimonia" would not be a mistake.
The efa is so specialized in looking for her role that having an alternative to work on mission would not be bad, as efa continue to look good on the air show.
then or the gripen (choice of nobel award) or "replaced" operation at cost tangled with hornets.
If I was a minister, I would take the F-35's throats and make an indecent proposal on f/a-18 to four money, 150 pieces all built ex novo in Italy and with the development license (this would be occupation).
for the marina I would go tomorrow morning to the marines to agree to develop together (to the English and to some European and Arab outsiders) a new version of the harier to produce also this in Italy.
to be able to discard the European monopoly of the efa and to get angry with immediate and economic proposals would be successful.
the f-35 is a dream, a futuristic project for the next 40 years that only reagan with the money of the star shield against the Soviet union could have managed, today it is economically unmanageable, net of technical problems.
Er Presidente
Guest
I don't take any wonders.... :
Er Presidente
Guest
that then... with the times that run... with the crisis... but because 200 f-16 to four money...
p.s.: those of the star still dream at night the vipers...first flight 1973. . .
p.s.: those of the star still dream at night the vipers...first flight 1973. . .
Exatem
Guest
therefore an aerial component based on updated tornado in a limited number of cells still "good" but still efficient (and of which we already have logistics); because there are now, it remains only to be accurately identified the tasks; av8 brought to the evolution "c" although at this moment I see it hard to involve the English (it turns out that they have already dismissed their waiting f35); in last gripen that apparently you value excellent or alternatively hornet to build in the house.
Okay, wait a second. . .
Don't tell me anything. I hate it!
Er Presidente
Guest
if you give him a valid alternative see where the f-35 arrives...the choice of scraping harriers was set by politics to prevent the marina from making operational comparisons and keeping an alternative path open.
Exatem
Guest
il superpipponethe public attention (it demonstrates in the “small our” also this 3ad), after decades of general indifference, is now centered on the themes of defense (although you often talk about it without knowing cause). all this media attention is simplistically focused exclusively on the economic/financial aspects of armaments, but fortunately this “window” offers the opportunity to discuss mostly unknown topics to the “big public”.
a question, among the many, has arisen from this analysis... who decides the purchase of a weapon system, is it a tank, a ship or, as in this case, a plane?
identifying only one exclusive subject is not possible. This is actually a mix of politics, industry and military. politics, however, has the last word, and that is why I believe that it is sufficient to attribute its responsibility.
It is good to clarify immediately that a project of this magnitude does not fall within the “free decisions” of our country, but, what many ignore, in a project dated 1994 of: reorganization, reorganization and coordination of the arms of the countries belonging to the born. According to this worthy project, each state specializes in a sector munendosi the specific armament going to compose, as a single “pezzo”, a common war puzzle.
defensive war system but in reality, of “preventive defense” ie, of attack. for this reason the equipment that has become obsolete must be replaced with other new products that integrate with those of the entire system born. In a context so described it is evident that the “margins” of the parliament of the various countries appear restricted, limited, since the decisions that count are examined within the “ supreme defence council” which is in close contact with what happens in the birthplace. as in the popular game, changing the contours of a single piece of the puzzle means compromising its final result.
It is a subject of extreme seriousness and with as much seriousness should be addressed. It is not a question of deciding whether to build more kindergartens or more hospitals, rather sterile polemics considering that birth is also part of countries with a much more efficient social system of ours (perhaps they spend only better), but to reflect on which model of defence we want to adhere. could be useful, for example, “to overcome” the model born and create a true “unitarian European force” to put at the service of the nations united as a “cuscinet” force to interpose between the rivals of the countless internal diatribes of unstable countries, but this is another story...
(follows...) )
a question, among the many, has arisen from this analysis... who decides the purchase of a weapon system, is it a tank, a ship or, as in this case, a plane?
identifying only one exclusive subject is not possible. This is actually a mix of politics, industry and military. politics, however, has the last word, and that is why I believe that it is sufficient to attribute its responsibility.
It is good to clarify immediately that a project of this magnitude does not fall within the “free decisions” of our country, but, what many ignore, in a project dated 1994 of: reorganization, reorganization and coordination of the arms of the countries belonging to the born. According to this worthy project, each state specializes in a sector munendosi the specific armament going to compose, as a single “pezzo”, a common war puzzle.
defensive war system but in reality, of “preventive defense” ie, of attack. for this reason the equipment that has become obsolete must be replaced with other new products that integrate with those of the entire system born. In a context so described it is evident that the “margins” of the parliament of the various countries appear restricted, limited, since the decisions that count are examined within the “ supreme defence council” which is in close contact with what happens in the birthplace. as in the popular game, changing the contours of a single piece of the puzzle means compromising its final result.
It is a subject of extreme seriousness and with as much seriousness should be addressed. It is not a question of deciding whether to build more kindergartens or more hospitals, rather sterile polemics considering that birth is also part of countries with a much more efficient social system of ours (perhaps they spend only better), but to reflect on which model of defence we want to adhere. could be useful, for example, “to overcome” the model born and create a true “unitarian European force” to put at the service of the nations united as a “cuscinet” force to interpose between the rivals of the countless internal diatribes of unstable countries, but this is another story...
(follows...) )
Exatem
Guest
of how a national strategic reflection has proved indispensable, it demonstrates the writing of a new “white book of defense” (of that of the 1970s I spoke of it in “above and under the waves”) by the government, also author of the cognitive investigation on the weapons systems of the defense commission. In reality the most serious shortage is the lack of “strategic culture” i.e., the ability to know how to deal with defense issues without falling hostages of the needs of the moment. what does “strategic culture” mean? interpreting clausewitz the strategic culture can be defined as the filter, interpretation, between events and the use of military means for political purposes. but the changing conditions of a country can transform the cultural system as it was, for example, the end of the Cold War. Here the great contradiction of Italian defence policy occurs, with the end of “bipolarism” peace and humanitarianism became the references of Italian politics. a superficiality manifested in the tired rhetoric of the “missions of peace”. is missing a communion of intent on which to address the themes of defence, just when, in the face of the undeniable need for revision of the armed forces, the need for a shared strategic culture appears indispensable.
Now there is a new focus and a greater will to play an active role even if facing the subject of equipment means facing only one of the defence systems. military policy, personnel, training, etc. are just as fundamental aspects and trying to reach general conclusions considering only one of these aspects, it is a mistake, which becomes insoluble, without an adequate framework of reference that is, the famous “white book”. if you do not clarify what will be the strategic scenario of the next 10-15 years, what will be threats, risks, usable tools, resources, technological evolution, etc... is a useless exercise. from here the important decision of the Minister of Defense, almost thirty years from the previous (and since then the armed forces have actively participated in the main international missions, from Afghanistan to libia), to start the drafting of the white book (that allego).
but let's try to move some criticism...
army: the "forza nec" program (network enabled capabilities) is critical, it is a joint defence-industry project, born to break down the times of communication and acquisition of information, which always represent a criticality in the conduct of military operations through new computer technologies. the philosophy of the project force nec is summed up in synthesis in the possibility to connect, directly and immediately, every single soldier with the decision center. the military on the ground will thus be able to access data banks as if it were in front of its pc, it will be able to communicate easily composable messages, will be able to see at night as day and to send images to all connected units on the net.
marina: the possible renunciation of a second aircraft unit is hypothesized. but in this way our aeronaval capacity would be intermittent, unusable in the periods of stop for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance of the cauliur.
Aeronautics: focus on bomber criticism f 35.
Unfortunately also in this case the same error is repeated for the umpteenth time: they cut or reduce programs or, instead, as in the case of the stability law, they start new ones without any interforce and balanced logic and without any default reference framework.
returning to the theme of this discussion, in any context we move, whether we like it or not, the reality is that we have old planes (and not only, also ships and earthly means but here we discuss f35), no longer useful to modern defence purposes. modernize them and keep them in service has costs that in the long term, can be higher than the expense needed to replace them.
back to the previous question... who decided to purchase? the decision was mainly of the military with the support of a transversal party in the center and in the centerleft and the strong pressures of industry. for the marina is an almost obligated choice (if you exclude the modernization of the av8) since the f35b is the only vertical take-off plane on the market and therefore the only one that can operate from our small air carriers garibaldi and cavour. the air force considers instead it is the best aircraft available for the attack missions. Thus Italy decided to replace tornado, amx and, av-8, aircraft introduced between the 80s and early 2000s and hence the Italian interest in the jsf program with the then government prodi. how much this operation costs us is not well defined (but the 20 billion euros) as it is not clear if the majority of this money is spent immediately or, being a multi-year program, “salms” on a long period.
to better understand, we support a report from the ministry of defence. on page 6 of the annex “c” of the additional note to the state of defense forecast for the year 2012, which was presented to the parliament by the minister of paola giampaolo defense in April last year, are exposed all the costs previewed for the program of the f-35.
under the heading “developing joint strike fighter aircraft”, which is the main item in the aviation investment sector, budgeted an expense of 548.7 million euros for 2012. In addition, the breakdown of the total expenditure for the programme, including the money already spent since 2002 (almost all in the research and development sector). some are strangely calculated in dollars, others are spread over several years, others are still not defined:
- for the development phase, approximately 1,028 million dollars, with expected completion in 2012;
- for the production support phase, approximately 900 million dollars, with completed in 2047;
- for predisposition activities in the national sphere, “honestly in the definition phase”;
- for final assembly, maintenance, revision, repair and update, approximately 795.6 million euros, with completion in 2014;
- for “the start of acquisition and logistic support”, about 10 billion euros by 2026.
In short, it is 12.2 billion by 2047, as well as a figure for “predisposition in the national field”. it would be 360 million a year but in reality the division is not broken equally. In fact, for 2012 they had taken into account 512 million and the same figure was calculated for 2013 and 2014. then there is the most consistent voice, that of the “starting of the acquisition and logistic support”. is the one that will come into play when the planes, in concrete, will come. Although it is spread over 24 years without further indication of other internal scaling, it is on average more than 400 million euros a year.
This is big figures but if compared to the European average we see that Italy spends about 1.2 percent of the pil in front of the average of 1,61 European. the surprising thing, that you can read on page 19 of the report, is that a third of this sum is spent on salaries.
It is undoubted that the jsf program is extremely expensive but, leaving aside the technical aspects and defects that the plane is showing, we hypothesize: We admit that problems are unresolvable and Italy is called out of the program, what would be the “technical” consequences at the present time? The 90 f35s should have replaced 235 between tornado, amx and av8... if we don't buy them what happens? could you convert the efa to the role of bomber as the English did? but for the av8?
but what do others do, for example the English? the nao, national audit office (the body of parliament making fleas to British public expenditure) examined the costs related to the program for the two new aircraft carriers of the royal navy and highlighted how f35b (those with short takeoff and vertical landing) show serious problems and limitations. for example, jsfs would not be able to land without having to dispose of heavy loads (bombs, missiles and additional fuel tanks) in the presence of particular climatic conditions, that is, “with a warm, humid temperature and characterized by low pressure”. as it is easy to guess, these are rather frequent conditions on carriers destined to operate in all the seas of the world. of course the lockheed martin has disputed these criticisms but London has however reduced from 138 to 48 the order and has also announced that a precise definition of the final quantity of planes ordered will not be carried out before 2015. In short, the F35 seems to be increasingly a failure.
the defense department has openly criticized the f-35, which, according to its own simulations, would not be able to compete with the Russian fighter bomber on-35 in an air combat, being slow in turning, rise in altitude and accelerate.
In conclusion, what had to be a brilliant idea, that is to create a single aircraft for 3 operational roles, is demonstrating an economic catastrophe, so much so that the same American navy has estimated that the maintenance costs of the f35 will be 30-40% higher than those of the currently in use hunting.
View attachment libro bianco.pdfView attachment leg.17.bol0229.data20140507.com04.pdf
Now there is a new focus and a greater will to play an active role even if facing the subject of equipment means facing only one of the defence systems. military policy, personnel, training, etc. are just as fundamental aspects and trying to reach general conclusions considering only one of these aspects, it is a mistake, which becomes insoluble, without an adequate framework of reference that is, the famous “white book”. if you do not clarify what will be the strategic scenario of the next 10-15 years, what will be threats, risks, usable tools, resources, technological evolution, etc... is a useless exercise. from here the important decision of the Minister of Defense, almost thirty years from the previous (and since then the armed forces have actively participated in the main international missions, from Afghanistan to libia), to start the drafting of the white book (that allego).
but let's try to move some criticism...
army: the "forza nec" program (network enabled capabilities) is critical, it is a joint defence-industry project, born to break down the times of communication and acquisition of information, which always represent a criticality in the conduct of military operations through new computer technologies. the philosophy of the project force nec is summed up in synthesis in the possibility to connect, directly and immediately, every single soldier with the decision center. the military on the ground will thus be able to access data banks as if it were in front of its pc, it will be able to communicate easily composable messages, will be able to see at night as day and to send images to all connected units on the net.
marina: the possible renunciation of a second aircraft unit is hypothesized. but in this way our aeronaval capacity would be intermittent, unusable in the periods of stop for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance of the cauliur.
Aeronautics: focus on bomber criticism f 35.
Unfortunately also in this case the same error is repeated for the umpteenth time: they cut or reduce programs or, instead, as in the case of the stability law, they start new ones without any interforce and balanced logic and without any default reference framework.
returning to the theme of this discussion, in any context we move, whether we like it or not, the reality is that we have old planes (and not only, also ships and earthly means but here we discuss f35), no longer useful to modern defence purposes. modernize them and keep them in service has costs that in the long term, can be higher than the expense needed to replace them.
back to the previous question... who decided to purchase? the decision was mainly of the military with the support of a transversal party in the center and in the centerleft and the strong pressures of industry. for the marina is an almost obligated choice (if you exclude the modernization of the av8) since the f35b is the only vertical take-off plane on the market and therefore the only one that can operate from our small air carriers garibaldi and cavour. the air force considers instead it is the best aircraft available for the attack missions. Thus Italy decided to replace tornado, amx and, av-8, aircraft introduced between the 80s and early 2000s and hence the Italian interest in the jsf program with the then government prodi. how much this operation costs us is not well defined (but the 20 billion euros) as it is not clear if the majority of this money is spent immediately or, being a multi-year program, “salms” on a long period.
to better understand, we support a report from the ministry of defence. on page 6 of the annex “c” of the additional note to the state of defense forecast for the year 2012, which was presented to the parliament by the minister of paola giampaolo defense in April last year, are exposed all the costs previewed for the program of the f-35.
under the heading “developing joint strike fighter aircraft”, which is the main item in the aviation investment sector, budgeted an expense of 548.7 million euros for 2012. In addition, the breakdown of the total expenditure for the programme, including the money already spent since 2002 (almost all in the research and development sector). some are strangely calculated in dollars, others are spread over several years, others are still not defined:
- for the development phase, approximately 1,028 million dollars, with expected completion in 2012;
- for the production support phase, approximately 900 million dollars, with completed in 2047;
- for predisposition activities in the national sphere, “honestly in the definition phase”;
- for final assembly, maintenance, revision, repair and update, approximately 795.6 million euros, with completion in 2014;
- for “the start of acquisition and logistic support”, about 10 billion euros by 2026.
In short, it is 12.2 billion by 2047, as well as a figure for “predisposition in the national field”. it would be 360 million a year but in reality the division is not broken equally. In fact, for 2012 they had taken into account 512 million and the same figure was calculated for 2013 and 2014. then there is the most consistent voice, that of the “starting of the acquisition and logistic support”. is the one that will come into play when the planes, in concrete, will come. Although it is spread over 24 years without further indication of other internal scaling, it is on average more than 400 million euros a year.
This is big figures but if compared to the European average we see that Italy spends about 1.2 percent of the pil in front of the average of 1,61 European. the surprising thing, that you can read on page 19 of the report, is that a third of this sum is spent on salaries.
It is undoubted that the jsf program is extremely expensive but, leaving aside the technical aspects and defects that the plane is showing, we hypothesize: We admit that problems are unresolvable and Italy is called out of the program, what would be the “technical” consequences at the present time? The 90 f35s should have replaced 235 between tornado, amx and av8... if we don't buy them what happens? could you convert the efa to the role of bomber as the English did? but for the av8?
but what do others do, for example the English? the nao, national audit office (the body of parliament making fleas to British public expenditure) examined the costs related to the program for the two new aircraft carriers of the royal navy and highlighted how f35b (those with short takeoff and vertical landing) show serious problems and limitations. for example, jsfs would not be able to land without having to dispose of heavy loads (bombs, missiles and additional fuel tanks) in the presence of particular climatic conditions, that is, “with a warm, humid temperature and characterized by low pressure”. as it is easy to guess, these are rather frequent conditions on carriers destined to operate in all the seas of the world. of course the lockheed martin has disputed these criticisms but London has however reduced from 138 to 48 the order and has also announced that a precise definition of the final quantity of planes ordered will not be carried out before 2015. In short, the F35 seems to be increasingly a failure.
the defense department has openly criticized the f-35, which, according to its own simulations, would not be able to compete with the Russian fighter bomber on-35 in an air combat, being slow in turning, rise in altitude and accelerate.
In conclusion, what had to be a brilliant idea, that is to create a single aircraft for 3 operational roles, is demonstrating an economic catastrophe, so much so that the same American navy has estimated that the maintenance costs of the f35 will be 30-40% higher than those of the currently in use hunting.
View attachment libro bianco.pdfView attachment leg.17.bol0229.data20140507.com04.pdf
tecnico_plast
Guest
Why would the gripen be preferable to the hornet?
Exatem
Guest
the news of a new block to the f35 project, resulting in the new recent problems, was welcomed by the left and the pacifists with the now tedious, repetitive, Filipino on the “useless” military expenses.
On the other hand, there has been a renewed call for not to throw the money already spent, to safeguard the air skills and to protect the jobs generated by the participation in the program.
if the f35 will be able to maintain what is promised, for the next 50 years our air forces will be dependent on the United States, a superpower that never as today, has operated against the interests of Europe and Italy.
I make an inerent example of f35. we have owners as well as co-producers, efa i.e., eurofighter typhoon.
aircraft that even if not “invisible” to redar, are capable of carrying out attacks as demonstrated by all the aircraft that have it online, excluding our who believes it only a hunt.
but the efa will embark on the cruise missile “storm shadow”, a long-range strategic missile for ground attack that “casually”, does not enter the hold of the f35, which again “casually”, is designed to accommodate only weapons made in use.
In short, evaluating those that may be the future missions of attacking areo to terrestrial objectives, typhoon is widely enough (Germany has about 160) except for us.
now the clamorous news is the recent fire occurred at hen. but there is nothing else like the fact that in reality the f35 is not so “sthealt” as it tells, not to mention the engine...
In fact, in 2012 the obama administration canceled the development of an Italian avian engine, which promised to be better than pratt & whitney or at least, to reduce its costs (currently $29 million per piece).
engine problems that especially concern us navy forced to accept a monomotor... and this not to mention the problems related to the combat system. .
but we forget the technical details for which there are much more authoritative users of me to talk about it.
We remain in Italy and do the accounts in our pockets at the Ministry of Defense. We immediately break the horizon from the clouds... the defense budget is currently paralysis.
there are no resources to maintain the current structure therefore, it is hardly possible to assume that the f35 can be afforded.
If you have read the multiannual programme document of the ministry, you will be aware that for the next few years the funds will fall under 14 billion annually. the percentage of pil will descend from 0,87 to 0,80 by 2016 without prospects of increase.
despite renzi si pavoneggi with the apparently good operation “mare nostrum”, an operation from boys-scout in which we use ships from 500 million € as ferries, the expenses for the solo staff will increase from 9,55 billion to 9,78, that is 70% of the money available from the defense despite the block of salaries of the employees for now 7 years. the funds for training will fall from 1.34 billion to 1.25, the acquisitions of new means will be able to count on 2.86 billion against the previous 3.22.
It is curious to see that nations economically superior, with even triple disponibility to ours, base their air fleets on one aircraft (typhoon the Germans or rafale the French), while we, if we can buy a sufficient number of f35, will not have the money to make them full.
summing up:
the F35 eliminates national sovereignty making us totally dependent on the use and lockheed martin.
we would have had to produce 1200 wings, alnia aermacchi has signed a contract for the supply of 20 wings.
We would have had to assemble 131 specimens but we have already descended to less than 90 whose maintenance has probably been broken by the great bretagna.
In fact a few months ago the British defense minister Normann hammond unveiled the existence of negotiations to install in the base of marham, in norfolk, the European maintenance center for the f35. londra is the second partner of the program after use but its center will be used by the Norwegians (48 f-36) and was also proposed to the Dutch. the British will acquire predictably 138 f-35 and also the Turks, with 100 units planned, have just inaugurated a factory to produce parts of the engine of the f-35 and aim to obtain the complete assembly line for their aircraft. the risk, pavented time back also by the general tricarious leonardo, former chief of state of the military aeronautica, today president of the icsa foundation, is that waiters continue to work in very low productive installments and therefore not convenient considering that the infrastructure has cost the taxpayers over 800 million €.
certainly derek chollet, Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security of Pentagon, recently arrived in Rome for a conference, has rushed to defend the program f35.
“in times of austerity governments must cut” but in the case of f35 it would be a mistake, because” it is an investment for the future and a fundamental component to increase military forces,” said chollet.
“Italy has already invested a lot. parts of f35 were built in Italy and gave work to more than 6,000 people. we ask to reconsider investments on f35′′′ in the next white book.
Natural that chollet defends American interests (any allied country that delays or stops the acquisitions of f-35 increases by 2-3 % the cost of aircraft for the forces used as the general bogdan said, at the head of the f-35 program) but it is the ulterior hear of those 6 thousand new jobs. . .
to waiters are employed little more than 200 people of which 80 are newly hired while 130 are being transferred from the alenia of Turin boxes. In fact, it is not even a question of new recruitments but teachers already engaged in the efa programme. the establishment cost us 814 million €.
now more than ever it is clear how the f-35 affair is conditioned by contrasting political and financial factors.
the most appropriate choice made it the spagna, like the Italian partner of the eurofighter program and that uses for its naval aviation the av-8b harrier. madrid in fact, will not acquire the joint fighter for the aerial fuerza but also for the sword that wanted to replace the av-8b with a twenty f35b. the harriers will be modernized, which we could do also waiting for better times.
then perhaps you could limit the damage and exit the program losing you the 4 billion spent in 15 years but obtaining an economic saving and gaining independently strategic.
On the other hand, there has been a renewed call for not to throw the money already spent, to safeguard the air skills and to protect the jobs generated by the participation in the program.
if the f35 will be able to maintain what is promised, for the next 50 years our air forces will be dependent on the United States, a superpower that never as today, has operated against the interests of Europe and Italy.
I make an inerent example of f35. we have owners as well as co-producers, efa i.e., eurofighter typhoon.
aircraft that even if not “invisible” to redar, are capable of carrying out attacks as demonstrated by all the aircraft that have it online, excluding our who believes it only a hunt.
but the efa will embark on the cruise missile “storm shadow”, a long-range strategic missile for ground attack that “casually”, does not enter the hold of the f35, which again “casually”, is designed to accommodate only weapons made in use.
In short, evaluating those that may be the future missions of attacking areo to terrestrial objectives, typhoon is widely enough (Germany has about 160) except for us.
now the clamorous news is the recent fire occurred at hen. but there is nothing else like the fact that in reality the f35 is not so “sthealt” as it tells, not to mention the engine...
In fact, in 2012 the obama administration canceled the development of an Italian avian engine, which promised to be better than pratt & whitney or at least, to reduce its costs (currently $29 million per piece).
engine problems that especially concern us navy forced to accept a monomotor... and this not to mention the problems related to the combat system. .
but we forget the technical details for which there are much more authoritative users of me to talk about it.
We remain in Italy and do the accounts in our pockets at the Ministry of Defense. We immediately break the horizon from the clouds... the defense budget is currently paralysis.
there are no resources to maintain the current structure therefore, it is hardly possible to assume that the f35 can be afforded.
If you have read the multiannual programme document of the ministry, you will be aware that for the next few years the funds will fall under 14 billion annually. the percentage of pil will descend from 0,87 to 0,80 by 2016 without prospects of increase.
despite renzi si pavoneggi with the apparently good operation “mare nostrum”, an operation from boys-scout in which we use ships from 500 million € as ferries, the expenses for the solo staff will increase from 9,55 billion to 9,78, that is 70% of the money available from the defense despite the block of salaries of the employees for now 7 years. the funds for training will fall from 1.34 billion to 1.25, the acquisitions of new means will be able to count on 2.86 billion against the previous 3.22.
It is curious to see that nations economically superior, with even triple disponibility to ours, base their air fleets on one aircraft (typhoon the Germans or rafale the French), while we, if we can buy a sufficient number of f35, will not have the money to make them full.
summing up:
the F35 eliminates national sovereignty making us totally dependent on the use and lockheed martin.
we would have had to produce 1200 wings, alnia aermacchi has signed a contract for the supply of 20 wings.
We would have had to assemble 131 specimens but we have already descended to less than 90 whose maintenance has probably been broken by the great bretagna.
In fact a few months ago the British defense minister Normann hammond unveiled the existence of negotiations to install in the base of marham, in norfolk, the European maintenance center for the f35. londra is the second partner of the program after use but its center will be used by the Norwegians (48 f-36) and was also proposed to the Dutch. the British will acquire predictably 138 f-35 and also the Turks, with 100 units planned, have just inaugurated a factory to produce parts of the engine of the f-35 and aim to obtain the complete assembly line for their aircraft. the risk, pavented time back also by the general tricarious leonardo, former chief of state of the military aeronautica, today president of the icsa foundation, is that waiters continue to work in very low productive installments and therefore not convenient considering that the infrastructure has cost the taxpayers over 800 million €.
certainly derek chollet, Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security of Pentagon, recently arrived in Rome for a conference, has rushed to defend the program f35.
“in times of austerity governments must cut” but in the case of f35 it would be a mistake, because” it is an investment for the future and a fundamental component to increase military forces,” said chollet.
“Italy has already invested a lot. parts of f35 were built in Italy and gave work to more than 6,000 people. we ask to reconsider investments on f35′′′ in the next white book.
Natural that chollet defends American interests (any allied country that delays or stops the acquisitions of f-35 increases by 2-3 % the cost of aircraft for the forces used as the general bogdan said, at the head of the f-35 program) but it is the ulterior hear of those 6 thousand new jobs. . .
to waiters are employed little more than 200 people of which 80 are newly hired while 130 are being transferred from the alenia of Turin boxes. In fact, it is not even a question of new recruitments but teachers already engaged in the efa programme. the establishment cost us 814 million €.
now more than ever it is clear how the f-35 affair is conditioned by contrasting political and financial factors.
the most appropriate choice made it the spagna, like the Italian partner of the eurofighter program and that uses for its naval aviation the av-8b harrier. madrid in fact, will not acquire the joint fighter for the aerial fuerza but also for the sword that wanted to replace the av-8b with a twenty f35b. the harriers will be modernized, which we could do also waiting for better times.
then perhaps you could limit the damage and exit the program losing you the 4 billion spent in 15 years but obtaining an economic saving and gaining independently strategic.
Lettore espatriato
Guest
to all of you,
As many others have done before me, I have followed this forum for a long time and these posts before I officially enrolled. I have an enormous admiration for you who have told so much and so articulated about the f35 and that, therefore, I would not seem offensive if I ask "simple" questions, I would ask you two things:
1) what distinguishes the task of "butter gun" and that of simple "caccia"? the possibility of bringing a certain warload to bring some "particular" weapons that one can carry and the other not? I say because I can't appreciate the difference in bombing capacity between efa and f35. Yet the efa was used to bomb in libia, I think (but given my poor technical knowledge, I would not confuse a 500 with a ferrari ..)
In Europe, apart from uk, who else will have f35 ? if the Germans remain on efa , does it mean that, in case of attacks, by hypothesis, on the north-east side, will the Italian planes have to intervene ? a bit like success lately during the born exercise?
3) I hope I have not made too much confusion.
Thank you.
As many others have done before me, I have followed this forum for a long time and these posts before I officially enrolled. I have an enormous admiration for you who have told so much and so articulated about the f35 and that, therefore, I would not seem offensive if I ask "simple" questions, I would ask you two things:
1) what distinguishes the task of "butter gun" and that of simple "caccia"? the possibility of bringing a certain warload to bring some "particular" weapons that one can carry and the other not? I say because I can't appreciate the difference in bombing capacity between efa and f35. Yet the efa was used to bomb in libia, I think (but given my poor technical knowledge, I would not confuse a 500 with a ferrari ..)
In Europe, apart from uk, who else will have f35 ? if the Germans remain on efa , does it mean that, in case of attacks, by hypothesis, on the north-east side, will the Italian planes have to intervene ? a bit like success lately during the born exercise?
3) I hope I have not made too much confusion.
Thank you.
Exatem
Guest
President... Say it's not true. :http://www.difesaonline.it/index.ph...olo-quattro-bombe-rispetto-alle-otto-previste