Exatem
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Do the English run? 24 October 1940 xviii.
after the speech of mussolini from the balcony of Piazza venezia with which he announced the entrance to war of Italy, in the major states of sedan and tokyo, no one can mask his impatience. all are convinced that Italy will announce a great military operation in the style that the lightning war of German invention today imposes. also the German agents of the secret service under the orders of admiral canaris fremono.
What are the Italians planning?
the answer is in the logic of tactics and strategies that war imposes. malt will be occupied by the Italians since the first day of war.
In fact, that tiny spot on nautical cards, represents a real plug in the flank in Italian operations in libia. also the German ally is of the same conviction.
the general enno von rintelen, military officer in Rome, is charged with discovering the intentions of the Italians but his research does not arrive at anything; so that canaris responds “evidently the Italians know how to keep their secrets better than the Germans”.
in malta on June 10th it is a warm torrid but since the radio announced the news of the entrance to the war of Italy, the English are hungry to make bassoon and move away from the island. all family members of the garrison are evacuated and aircraft and ships leave mortar.
in the rush to evacuate the island, the English carrier “glorius” forgets three “gladiator” planes disassembled in a warehouse.
will be the three planes destined to become famous with the nicknames of “faith”, “hope” and “charity” (the last two of which will be knocked down by our hunt, while “faith” will survive the conflict and is still exhibited in the Valais museum). the names with which these three planes were baptized are symptomatic of the state of mind of the defenders of the island. no one in London is willing to bet a penny on the fate of mortar. Moreover, with Sicily at 80 km and the Italian bombers at half an hour of flight it is useless to get illusions.
but the incredible happens.
the Italian commands turn their attention exclusively to the dazzling france and neglect the only objective that could turn in our favor the war in the Mediterranean.
strangely the most disappointed one is the military officer in roma of the Japanese Empire who fails to explain the Italian decision. “mussolini declared on the 10th day that Italy would start hostilities the next day. Why warn the enemy in advance? Then came the 11th, the 12th, the 13, the 14th and I still expected the start of operations against malt. all this is absolutely incomprehensible.”
Even the English initially do not believe the Italian error, but when they realize it, following the indications of churchill, they begin to fortify the island by turning it into a deadly offensive weapon.
on 9 July 1940 for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, an Italian naval formation comes into contact with the “mediterranean fleet” that is, the English fleet in the Mediterranean. for a casualty the two formations are spotted 30 miles from tip in calabria. the meeting is called casual because neither of them went out to hunt the opponent. the Italians fall from Benghazi after having escorted a convoy of supplies while our opponents went out from an Alexandrian to go against a convoy departed from mortar.
the ratio of forces appears quite balanced.
the British commander andrew cunningham has the armoured “warspite”, “malaya” and “royal sovereign”, of the aircraft carrier “eagle” with 17 aircraft, five light cruisers and fourteen fighters.
inigo champions, Italian admiral, has two battleships, the “cavour” and the “julio cesare”, six heavy cruisers; “trento”, “fiume”, “zara”, “pola”, “gorizia” and “bolzano”, eight light cruisers, sixteen destroyers.
at 13,15 Italian cruisers are attacked without success by aerosilurants of the eagle. the next two hours spend in a relative calm with the Italians who maneuver to give time to the air force to intervene in support. here is one of the strangeness of the Italian strategic approach represented by the independence of the various weapons. the amm. samples, to get the aerial support must ask for the authorization to the nearest marine command that in turn, must turn the request to the nearest air command.
at 15.15 the first contact between cruisers occurs. the fight lasts 15 minutes without registering damage between the parts excluded some splinters on the English “neptune”. at 15.31 the 381 mm English frame our cruisers who manoeuvre to take off shooting while the cauliur and the cesare julium open fire from 30,000 meters.
the precision of Italian shooting recommends the English to maintain a certain caution. but at 15.37 a blow of the seventh save of the warspite center the cesare julion on the poppiero fumaiolo. the resulting fire causes the entrance of gas and fumes in the engine room so that the speed drops to 18 knots.
specimens, to avoid leaving the cesare alone, orders a combination to the left under the protection of the smokescreens and launches the attack with the torpedo boats. the Bolzano is reached by three bullets one of which damages the rudder while the cesare, remedies to the damage suffered and resumes the course to 22 knots of speed. the Italians continue to fold towards messina chased up to 25 miles from the calabria by the English.
at that point cunningham decides that it is time to suspend the hunt.
our planes arrive, as it was logical, when the clash is now finished (although 126 our planes attack the enemy ships until late evening). eagle, malaya and warspite are affected but suffer limited damage.
our commands emphasized beyond measure the clash and mussolini was convinced that half of the enemy fleet had been put out of combat.
This first battle showed how serious was the lack of coordination between our armed forces against an opponent who, on the contrary, managed to amalgamate their own.
Unfortunately, no teaching was taken from this lesson.
the war goes wrong, on 27 September was signed the tripartite pact between germany, japan and Italy and on 28 October we invaded the Greek but germany practically lost the battle of inghilterra.
hitler had to give up the planned invasion of the island.
after the speech of mussolini from the balcony of Piazza venezia with which he announced the entrance to war of Italy, in the major states of sedan and tokyo, no one can mask his impatience. all are convinced that Italy will announce a great military operation in the style that the lightning war of German invention today imposes. also the German agents of the secret service under the orders of admiral canaris fremono.
What are the Italians planning?
the answer is in the logic of tactics and strategies that war imposes. malt will be occupied by the Italians since the first day of war.
In fact, that tiny spot on nautical cards, represents a real plug in the flank in Italian operations in libia. also the German ally is of the same conviction.
the general enno von rintelen, military officer in Rome, is charged with discovering the intentions of the Italians but his research does not arrive at anything; so that canaris responds “evidently the Italians know how to keep their secrets better than the Germans”.
in malta on June 10th it is a warm torrid but since the radio announced the news of the entrance to the war of Italy, the English are hungry to make bassoon and move away from the island. all family members of the garrison are evacuated and aircraft and ships leave mortar.
in the rush to evacuate the island, the English carrier “glorius” forgets three “gladiator” planes disassembled in a warehouse.
will be the three planes destined to become famous with the nicknames of “faith”, “hope” and “charity” (the last two of which will be knocked down by our hunt, while “faith” will survive the conflict and is still exhibited in the Valais museum). the names with which these three planes were baptized are symptomatic of the state of mind of the defenders of the island. no one in London is willing to bet a penny on the fate of mortar. Moreover, with Sicily at 80 km and the Italian bombers at half an hour of flight it is useless to get illusions.
but the incredible happens.
the Italian commands turn their attention exclusively to the dazzling france and neglect the only objective that could turn in our favor the war in the Mediterranean.
strangely the most disappointed one is the military officer in roma of the Japanese Empire who fails to explain the Italian decision. “mussolini declared on the 10th day that Italy would start hostilities the next day. Why warn the enemy in advance? Then came the 11th, the 12th, the 13, the 14th and I still expected the start of operations against malt. all this is absolutely incomprehensible.”
Even the English initially do not believe the Italian error, but when they realize it, following the indications of churchill, they begin to fortify the island by turning it into a deadly offensive weapon.
on 9 July 1940 for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, an Italian naval formation comes into contact with the “mediterranean fleet” that is, the English fleet in the Mediterranean. for a casualty the two formations are spotted 30 miles from tip in calabria. the meeting is called casual because neither of them went out to hunt the opponent. the Italians fall from Benghazi after having escorted a convoy of supplies while our opponents went out from an Alexandrian to go against a convoy departed from mortar.
the ratio of forces appears quite balanced.
the British commander andrew cunningham has the armoured “warspite”, “malaya” and “royal sovereign”, of the aircraft carrier “eagle” with 17 aircraft, five light cruisers and fourteen fighters.
inigo champions, Italian admiral, has two battleships, the “cavour” and the “julio cesare”, six heavy cruisers; “trento”, “fiume”, “zara”, “pola”, “gorizia” and “bolzano”, eight light cruisers, sixteen destroyers.
at 13,15 Italian cruisers are attacked without success by aerosilurants of the eagle. the next two hours spend in a relative calm with the Italians who maneuver to give time to the air force to intervene in support. here is one of the strangeness of the Italian strategic approach represented by the independence of the various weapons. the amm. samples, to get the aerial support must ask for the authorization to the nearest marine command that in turn, must turn the request to the nearest air command.
at 15.15 the first contact between cruisers occurs. the fight lasts 15 minutes without registering damage between the parts excluded some splinters on the English “neptune”. at 15.31 the 381 mm English frame our cruisers who manoeuvre to take off shooting while the cauliur and the cesare julium open fire from 30,000 meters.
the precision of Italian shooting recommends the English to maintain a certain caution. but at 15.37 a blow of the seventh save of the warspite center the cesare julion on the poppiero fumaiolo. the resulting fire causes the entrance of gas and fumes in the engine room so that the speed drops to 18 knots.
specimens, to avoid leaving the cesare alone, orders a combination to the left under the protection of the smokescreens and launches the attack with the torpedo boats. the Bolzano is reached by three bullets one of which damages the rudder while the cesare, remedies to the damage suffered and resumes the course to 22 knots of speed. the Italians continue to fold towards messina chased up to 25 miles from the calabria by the English.
at that point cunningham decides that it is time to suspend the hunt.
our planes arrive, as it was logical, when the clash is now finished (although 126 our planes attack the enemy ships until late evening). eagle, malaya and warspite are affected but suffer limited damage.
our commands emphasized beyond measure the clash and mussolini was convinced that half of the enemy fleet had been put out of combat.
This first battle showed how serious was the lack of coordination between our armed forces against an opponent who, on the contrary, managed to amalgamate their own.
Unfortunately, no teaching was taken from this lesson.
the war goes wrong, on 27 September was signed the tripartite pact between germany, japan and Italy and on 28 October we invaded the Greek but germany practically lost the battle of inghilterra.
hitler had to give up the planned invasion of the island.
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