MBT
Guest
I...
It's the house and the career. :biggrin:
It's the house and the career. :biggrin:
numero1
Guest
I understand it and... maybe I can also understand the furnace, but ichino?The career is already shaved to the ground, you arrived late... after bow, brunette and furnace.
why
Exatem
Guest
ichino was the "inspirer museum" of the little Venetian justiceist.I understand it and... maybe I can also understand the furnace, but ichino?
why
numero1
Guest
I really knew (or would have thought) that it was the "inspirer museum" of Turin.
Thanks anyway.
Thanks anyway.
Exatem
Guest
some passages are deliberately little in-depth indeed, sometimes only hinted at both for my poor documentation on it, and because I judged them, perhaps erroneously, secondary to the main "history".
but still the observations are right and deserve a deepening.
That said, we come to the answer to point 2 (for others, I take a little more time).
in the intentions of mussolini, the capital of the rsi had to be milan, but the German “consigli” made him accept the seat on the garda. He probably realized that the end of the siege was inevitable and that the allies soon would have knocked down the Gothic line and at that point neither the Germans would have managed to stop the advance. However, while knowing very well that the resistance on the gothic would not have been as determined as it had been on the gustav, he continued to refuse the evidence that the German command considered the Italian campaign now useless and to close as soon as possible. and this despite the fact that rumors of a contact between Germans and allies were insistent to agree on the surrender.
mussolini understood to have very few exit routes but if the Republicans wanted to close their history with honor they had no other alternative to the fight. a negotiation with resistance would appear to the Germans as the second, unforgivable betrayal.
at this point it was only necessary to establish where to fight. and this was the subject of discussion between the leaders of the siege. pavolini had elaborated the defence plan in Valtellina that had been approved by the duce.
the “reduced” (rar - reduced republican alpine) was a real fixed for pavolini that had also hypothesized the transfer of the danten bones. the fascist forces would have been unified in a single weapon of fighters concentrated in the Valtellina where the duce, surrounded by the major hierarchies, would sell at high price the skin so as to force the allies to come to terms with the siege.
the valtellina had been chosen because it allowed to have the shoulders covered by the Swiss and guaranteed a way of escape in the Helvetic country. the Valtellina also allowed access to the upper adige and from there, to the baviera where goering ensured that Nazism would resist until the last. also was close to Milan the capital dreamed by the duce.
the fact that mussolini had approved the plan does not mean that he believed you. by now he learned to distrust the rhetoric of the hierarchies and knew how much difference was between the pavolini parolone and reality.
At the end of March, the Foreign Minister of the Anfuso, persuaded Mussolini to preside over a meeting whose agenda was the question of the Valtellina. pavolini had to be forced to go out in the open so the federal of firenze decided to carry out a personal inspection. on 5 April he presented himself to the duce with a detailed report in which he was forced to recognize that the valtellina burned with partisans and the black brigades were reduced to a few more fearful units than to battle.
the subject was then resumed on 14 while the Germans were already secretly dealing with the allies. pavolini exposed the detailed plans for the Valtellina then the meeting ended with some conclusions on the death of roosevelt.
later Mussolini decided to break every hardship and in the morning of 16 declared he wanted to leave for Milan where he would be beaten turning the city into a second staling. the most contrary were the Germans who did not want to leave the road to the Brenner. but mussolini had decided and the 18 five cars departed from gargano for the Lombard capital. but Milan was not willing to turn into the Soviet city and mussolini had to limit himself to something less ambitious, transform the prefecture and the area around as the bunker of sedan (although there were no bunkers).
the Allies broke down the Gothic and crossed the po and the 22 Mussolini declared himself ready to surrender the powers to the socialist party but rejected the offer. the next day the clnai of which was part sandro pertini, blocked the railway network. left alone, abandoned by former allies, mussolini tried to get in touch with the resistance to treat surrender and for this reason he contacted Cardinal schuster. so he managed to contact the representatives of the clnai who, however, did not feel reasons and pertini, was the most inflexible.
numero1
Guest
Of course it is obvious that sometimes you can not deepen as you would like, I figure; I try to be as stringed as possible within the limits of precision.
However another beautiful post substantially exact, only one thing:
the clnai had all intentions to accept the surrender of mussolini, but not to the conditions of mussolini precisely.
Pertini was not present at the meeting at the archbishopric, he could not arrive in time and almost clashed with the furious duce coming out of the interview room and that he did not even recognize it.
furious because precisely the members of the clnai present had rejected the "sual" conditions, if instead he had accepted would be carried out in that apartment and then tried, then condemned and, perhaps I say perhaps executed.
I would not be surprised if the allies had pressed such pressures by......... You understand me.
Maybe in exchange for that fancy card.
but it didn't go like that......
Hi.
However another beautiful post substantially exact, only one thing:
the clnai had all intentions to accept the surrender of mussolini, but not to the conditions of mussolini precisely.
Pertini was not present at the meeting at the archbishopric, he could not arrive in time and almost clashed with the furious duce coming out of the interview room and that he did not even recognize it.
furious because precisely the members of the clnai present had rejected the "sual" conditions, if instead he had accepted would be carried out in that apartment and then tried, then condemned and, perhaps I say perhaps executed.
I would not be surprised if the allies had pressed such pressures by......... You understand me.
Maybe in exchange for that fancy card.
but it didn't go like that......
Hi.
numero1
Guest
Speaking of mussolini prison, I remembered square diaz instead......
"no, on April 24 was thought of an arrest and a process of mussolini. rich lombardi, designated Milanese prefect by the Liberation Committee confirms: "I had prepared a prison san vittore and a trusted partisan guard capable of keeping the nerves in place."
cast iron:http://www.feltrinellieditore.it/fattilibriinterna?id_fatto=4547and there are a lot of other interesting details in that article.
Hi.
"no, on April 24 was thought of an arrest and a process of mussolini. rich lombardi, designated Milanese prefect by the Liberation Committee confirms: "I had prepared a prison san vittore and a trusted partisan guard capable of keeping the nerves in place."
cast iron:http://www.feltrinellieditore.it/fattilibriinterna?id_fatto=4547and there are a lot of other interesting details in that article.
Hi.
Exatem
Guest
No. missing my version. . :tongue:
of the card that would intervene between winston churchill and benign mussolini and in particular of its "disappearance", they have made a proposition of hypotheses so much that at this point, instead of adding further or repeating of already known, I would like to take a license and to make some on the content of this card and on its possible consequences rather than its end (which I will try to define anyway).
we focus on certain points of the story:
1) no one has ever read the contents of the cards in possession of mussolini during the capture, except for a few peeks of fascists and partisans, except for him dear priors of gonzaga, antifascist of the o.r.i. that read those before the entry into the war of Italy, in the offices of the como police office as written in a memorial of 1998/2000 published in his signature on the magazine new contemporary history (January-February 2000), in which he admitted he had seen the 62 missives exchanged between 1936 and 1940. In fact, the former partisan revealed that probably the cards would be kept in a safe deposit box in a Swiss bank after he had delivered them to alcide de gasperi through the intervention of Count pier maria annoni di gussola, a notable Christian Democrat who at the time served as a conservative deputy commissioner of the goods and documents of the former r.s.i.
2) of these mussolini documents made three copies between February and April 1945 in order to make the content known to the Italian people.
3) from the testimonies of the historical renzo de felici e di priori, the 62 autograph letters of the two leaders contained an English-Italian agreement.
4) Mussolini considered these documents so important to carry them with him until the capture of dongo.
5) the contents of the documents were known until 22 March 1945 only five persons as demonstrated by a German telephone intercept between mussolini and claretta petacci therefore, were documents of the utmost secrecy.
to certain data, I add some considerations however suffragated by a discrete probability of foundation:
1) Italian militarily was in 1940, a jar of coccio between iron vases and this mussolini was aware.
2) World War II was unleashed by lobbyists who always held the monopoly of the riches of the planet and did not intend to deprive it.
3) all countries, including Germany, were driven by exclusive geopolitical interests that prevailed over ideologies and policies.
4) In the immediate post-war period, British secret services were activated to recover the originals of the secret card. after churchill was re-elected to the government, priori was approached by British secret agents who offered him the fabulous £100,000 if he had guaranteed the return of the card to the trepidating downing street tenant.
I venture into imaginative and personal considerations, based on the points previously announced.
so that Italy could continue to maintain the colonies (this is not the place to discuss the need to have such colonies) continuing the growth phase imposed by the regime and manifested in the 1930s, it was essential to maintain the balance between the secular British power and the increasing German force. in this perspective mussolini had proposed himself as mediator (as in the monk conference). but in May of 40 france was on the brink of capitulation and a possible peace agreement between land and germany would have cut us off from every negotiation table. Moreover, in the face of a possible continuation of the conflict, we could have been involved despite both an ally attack on Germany from the south or with a preventive/defensive invasion by the Germans.
On the basis of this simple exposition of the European situation, he opted for the descent into the field alongside the germany, but at this moment it seems certain a letter of churchill to the duce in which he would ask him expressly to enter the war so that he could count on Italy once at the table of peace to limit the German claims. In short, the descent into war would be conditioned by a secret agreement with the English.
Let us see what aspect I can bring to support this hypothesis.
several times I have been able to emphasize the wonder, the amazement, the unbelief, that the failure to attack Italy in mortar at the beginning of the conflict occurred both among the allies of the axis and between the opponents. but if we analyze the first month of war in practice we have not made any significant action both strategically and tactical.
Let's limit ourselves to malt! What if the missed malt attack was actually a wanted one? If it were the content of a compromise which we have ignored nature?
Of course, in that phase of the war an agreement that assures the great brethren limited damages and conditions advantageous to the detriment of the franc, is not a completely peregrine hypothesis ... it is not to be surprised, it is situations that in history have repeated several times and that in this case, they would be poisoned by a telegram dated August 1939, found seems recently in the state archives, in which mussolini, addressing to the king says: “I will desire majesty, waiting to send you all the epistle exchanged with the fuhrer, anticipate the conclusions. that is, Italy will limit itself at least in the first phase of the conflict to a purely demonstrative attitude. French and English have let us know that they will do the same.” Can it be that in June 40 we still rely on this agreement?
Moreover before becoming Prime Minister Sir Winston churchill was the first lord of the Admiralty and therefore, he would have had no difficulty in retaining contacts with foreign authorities. Moreover in May of 40 there was dunkerque followed in June from the retreat from Norway while America was not interested in European events. the military situation at that time was anything but favorable for the English therefore it is plausible that an honorable peace with Germany was sought thanks to the Italian intermediation (in the search for peace between English and Germans we must also insert the "mysterious" flight on the slag of rudolf hess of May 1941).
and what would we have earned in this context?
territorial offers at the expense of the franc? Probably because churchill himself stated how he always tried to do his best to keep Italy out of the conflict. for this reason the Prime Minister would have abandoned the French and offered the Dalmatian and the isria, the islands of the dodecaneso, the tunisia, the lane and the nizza. an exaggerated reward given that germany, likely winner of the conflict at that time, would hardly have granted gifts of such magnitude especially in the light of the agreements resulting from the creation of the Vichy government.
but this agreement was actually hiding a trap. Let's imagine a different scenario from how things really went. the war ended with the German victory and mussolini stood at the table of peace negotiations, claiming, without having fired a blow, what promised by the English (that in this reconstruction are, we do not forget, defeats).
churchill has nothing to lose, to save his homeland would promise and accept everything. On the contrary, the duce if he had announced the agreement should have explained the reasons for the entry into war. It was a commitment that would not have been possible to honor and it seems unlikely that both mussolini and the king did not realize it.
but churchill is known for his stubbornness and seems unlikely to think of a surrender with germany.
therefore the card had to contain other.
Is it a strategy to broaden the conflict and demonstrate to the world the will not to surrender by unleashing his armies against the weak ally of the Germans hoping for immediate US intervention? according to this hypothesis churchill would invite mussolini to go down to war with the promise of a place at the table of peace and with the tacit agreement not to get too bad. the duce on his part, aware of the unpreparedness and weakness of the armed forces, would be convinced that it was a real opportunity not to miss.
if so, Italy remarried the pacts not taking any serious initiative in the first months of war (report). If this is the truth of dongo cards, it is evident that the English did everything to get into possession, it would have been extremely embarrassing to justify the request for intervention aimed at Italy and at the same time to take responsibility for the conflict.
science fiction?
numero1
Guest
Yes.......... at least part:
I explain better, nothing to say about the first 5 points, some things I knew already others not’ but still great writing, as always on which I allow me only to add this:
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/...a_carissimi_priori_vide_co_0_0208238379.shtmlon the second 4 points are not entirely in agreement, in particular where you write:
2) World War II was unleashed by lobbyists who always held the monopoly of the riches of the planet and did not intend to deprive it.very opinabile, lobbies (and companies) have benefited with the war, but from here to unleash it ........ e.g. PCs did not exist but ibm sold its perforated cards to the reich that used them for the “final solution”.
How do you think they could handle all that human flow otherwise?
ibm was not (obviously) aware of the use of cards, she says ..... admitted and not allowed that it was so at first it is difficult for me that after some time they had not suspected something.
We also keep in mind that it was still an American company that traded with the enemy.
3) all countries, including Germany, were driven by exclusive geopolitical interests that prevailed over ideologies and policies.completely dissatisfied, it is precisely the opposite according to me, were the ideological and political springs that gave the initial thrust.
the interests + peat and + various, but only and only after the initial thrust.
on the last part of your post, what you call: “Imaginative and personal considerations” I can only say that yes, your conclusions would explain everything, but to me it seems a really reconstruction at the limit .........
the escape of hess can be explained in a thousand ways, for example that he had understood before anyone else that germany started to ruin.
In fact according to your reconstruction his escape is subordinate to the fact that he knew the content of the card, but on the other hand if he knew of the cards because not to kill him immediately, a witness less.
to condemn him to death to Nuremberg no.... in fact he could stand up and say: “our honor .....”
If what you say about the telegram of the duce is correct, the thing does not amaze me + so much.
benign and adolf had established some things, and all right, on the fact that the france and the great bretagna were aware of this he says .........
:biggrin:
Exatem
Guest
I mean mainly the primary resources of which the monopoly (or almost) was held.
the advent of Nazism and fascism are seen as the consequences of the treaties at the conclusion of the World War that created the conditions for such ideologies to be established. the territorial demands of germany, are a consequence of the very strict treatment reserved at the end of the great war. as well as when, for Italy, we talk about "voiced victory" which was one of the causes of widespread discontent.
I explained badly.
no that hess tried to contact the Duke of Hamilton because he was aware of the carding (although it is not so unlikely). I wanted to emphasize that peace attempts were conducted throughout the initial phase of the conflict by many, if not all, the contenders. However, it is also true that he died at 93 years, on the eve of his scarceness, in circumstances never clarified. was found in the yard of the prison with a narrow electric cable around the throat. and even if the official version speaks of suicide, hess would remain victim to a murder to prevent him from making statements and clarifications about his mysterious peace mission.
However even when we have different opinions (and less bad otherwise the discussion would already die), I very much appreciate your kind of dissent.
Bye.
numero1
Guest
Okay.
What is the reason for economic reasons?
Of course, it is obvious that Germany lost the first war had very strict conditions, if I had been a German, I would have been amazed otherwise.
and it is also true that with less severe conditions Nazi fascism would have had + difficulty to be born but ....... but not to be born at all is everything to prove.
We look at a moment at the great war, just before it germany was a powerful and prosperous country at least as others.
of course there were problems and international tensions but however the reich was the reich, then pum pum to Sarajevo and the heir to the throne is killed, and badabum the miccia is blinded and everything bursts.
but for nationalism and desire for blind and absolute power, then in 1939 revenge and desire for rivalry, on which they became engaged commercial interests, but only after.
I risk a daring comparison but in the 90s we witness, in the same places to the Bosnian massacre.
but you will not come to tell me that Bosnia, Serb, Montenegro etc. are rich in oil, plutonium, gold and what else, that is, "primary resources".
All right, but in the case of hess, I keep telling you the same question, why didn't they just put him out of the drain?
they made up a story, whatever... I've had him live so long, it seems like a useless risk and he's taken away his sleep from many people if you're right.
If he had really committed suicide because after so much time he spent in spandau he was just afraid to go out, to live?
prego :wink:
ciao
Oldwarper
Guest
Oh, man!:biggrin::biggrin:
even if they are completely 'native in history I follow you always!!! (when I have time... )
I just can read and enjoy it!:finger:
Exatem
Guest
I know who the aficionados are.
Exatem
Guest
the great illusionist. (conclusion)
From the beginning of hostilities, party propaganda was given a great deal to create enthusiasm for war and confidence in the inevitable victory.
As the defeats in Africa, Greek and, in Russian, they put the regime with their backs on the wall, his voice became increasingly obsessive and noisy.
the call to arms was the test bench of the Italians and the victory remained a quiet certainty because among all the peoples of the earth we were “the smartest, the most imaginative, the bravest, the strongest”. to these Italians fascism had developed character by putting them in a position of advantage over other peoples.
the duce then was recognized as the greatest leader of modern times and the Italians could count a considerable advantage by being able to rely on his judgment and wisdom. the world was destined to enter the orbit of fascism by adopting its ideas and recognizing the intellectual superiority of Italians. democracies were condemned to defeat because they were directed to the past and consequently, backwards of at least a century.
from how things went to finish you can define everything as a spectacle of great illusionism.
history tells us that mussolini was not the only actor of this illusion.
at least ten “major” hierarchy contributed first to the suppression of freedom and then to the military disaster.
were initially followers, collaborators, faithful; later fades, distrust, opponents. almost all the leaders of the First World War, initially perhaps moved by good intentions, turned into ruthless opponents of democratic parties, trade union organizations and in particular, of the Socialist Party.
only great god survived the war; only bottai died of natural death; cyan and de bono were shot from the sieves; arpinates, flours, pavolini and starace killed by the partisans; mutes killed in mysterious circumstances by a carabiniere under the caregiver government; "by mistake" (?) from our Contraerea in libia.
some of them did not or did not want to induce moderation the dictator and history reproached them that they did not oppose the steel pact and war, even if they knew of an inevitable defeat. They understood that Italy was about to make a fatal mistake, but they did not oppose it, they did nothing to make the nation understand that a part of fascism feared this commitment.
some of the hierarchies were enriched without scruples.
flourishes, the moralist of the regime, enlisted everything he could.
Others, like balbos or arpinates, proved to be honest but greedy of honors and awards. all lived and grew in the shadow of mussolini.
a dictator that if we today judged exclusively on how he managed to intimidate Europe with the image of an increased power of his own country, he would see many of his detractors forced to admit that it was a very remarkable figure.
that if it were to be judged for how and to what extent it modified the country, it would obtain a probably favorable assessment.
that if it were to be evaluated for what he said as a political man, it would be evaluated as a politician of the third order (the wars of the duce of d. mack).
In short, the evaluations depend fatally on personal and subjective considerations but a conclusion, as well as a preface, is a place where prejudices and hypotheses can be declared without feeling the need to apologize.
history must not condemn or prosecute. history cannot and must not even erase its most embarrassing aspects, but it has the duty to try to understand and translate the past to make it readable in modern eyes without distortion.
when the defeat came unexpectedly, many of the leaders of fascism admitted that “maybe something wrong” he had to be there and were very quick to discharge the big responsibility to mussolini who, rethinking in the last moments of his life to the past, had to resign himself to admit his grave responsibility; that of not being able to persuade two European leaders.
He was convinced that if Hitler and churchill listened to him, it would have been possible to save Europe from the disaster.
he was convinced that he had to fulfil the role of moderator between germany and english.
he was convinced that historians would recognize him the merit of creating fascism, that is, an idea destined to survive defeat.
he was convinced that he was able to be obeyed for twenty years by a naturally rebellious people, with what he called his “political work”. Avulsed by reality, living in a world of fantasies and illusions, where roboating and impregnated words of rhetoric had taken the place of the facts, remained until the last convinced that propaganda was the essential weapon whose essential task was to keep up the myth of the infallibility of the head.
Whereas the Italians are probably not a people of creduloni, we must recognize that mussolini was an authentic virtuoso of illusionism.
but it was precisely this virtuosity that brought Italy to defeat.
From the beginning of hostilities, party propaganda was given a great deal to create enthusiasm for war and confidence in the inevitable victory.
As the defeats in Africa, Greek and, in Russian, they put the regime with their backs on the wall, his voice became increasingly obsessive and noisy.
the call to arms was the test bench of the Italians and the victory remained a quiet certainty because among all the peoples of the earth we were “the smartest, the most imaginative, the bravest, the strongest”. to these Italians fascism had developed character by putting them in a position of advantage over other peoples.
the duce then was recognized as the greatest leader of modern times and the Italians could count a considerable advantage by being able to rely on his judgment and wisdom. the world was destined to enter the orbit of fascism by adopting its ideas and recognizing the intellectual superiority of Italians. democracies were condemned to defeat because they were directed to the past and consequently, backwards of at least a century.
from how things went to finish you can define everything as a spectacle of great illusionism.
history tells us that mussolini was not the only actor of this illusion.
at least ten “major” hierarchy contributed first to the suppression of freedom and then to the military disaster.
were initially followers, collaborators, faithful; later fades, distrust, opponents. almost all the leaders of the First World War, initially perhaps moved by good intentions, turned into ruthless opponents of democratic parties, trade union organizations and in particular, of the Socialist Party.
only great god survived the war; only bottai died of natural death; cyan and de bono were shot from the sieves; arpinates, flours, pavolini and starace killed by the partisans; mutes killed in mysterious circumstances by a carabiniere under the caregiver government; "by mistake" (?) from our Contraerea in libia.
some of them did not or did not want to induce moderation the dictator and history reproached them that they did not oppose the steel pact and war, even if they knew of an inevitable defeat. They understood that Italy was about to make a fatal mistake, but they did not oppose it, they did nothing to make the nation understand that a part of fascism feared this commitment.
some of the hierarchies were enriched without scruples.
flourishes, the moralist of the regime, enlisted everything he could.
Others, like balbos or arpinates, proved to be honest but greedy of honors and awards. all lived and grew in the shadow of mussolini.
a dictator that if we today judged exclusively on how he managed to intimidate Europe with the image of an increased power of his own country, he would see many of his detractors forced to admit that it was a very remarkable figure.
that if it were to be judged for how and to what extent it modified the country, it would obtain a probably favorable assessment.
that if it were to be evaluated for what he said as a political man, it would be evaluated as a politician of the third order (the wars of the duce of d. mack).
In short, the evaluations depend fatally on personal and subjective considerations but a conclusion, as well as a preface, is a place where prejudices and hypotheses can be declared without feeling the need to apologize.
history must not condemn or prosecute. history cannot and must not even erase its most embarrassing aspects, but it has the duty to try to understand and translate the past to make it readable in modern eyes without distortion.
when the defeat came unexpectedly, many of the leaders of fascism admitted that “maybe something wrong” he had to be there and were very quick to discharge the big responsibility to mussolini who, rethinking in the last moments of his life to the past, had to resign himself to admit his grave responsibility; that of not being able to persuade two European leaders.
He was convinced that if Hitler and churchill listened to him, it would have been possible to save Europe from the disaster.
he was convinced that he had to fulfil the role of moderator between germany and english.
he was convinced that historians would recognize him the merit of creating fascism, that is, an idea destined to survive defeat.
he was convinced that he was able to be obeyed for twenty years by a naturally rebellious people, with what he called his “political work”. Avulsed by reality, living in a world of fantasies and illusions, where roboating and impregnated words of rhetoric had taken the place of the facts, remained until the last convinced that propaganda was the essential weapon whose essential task was to keep up the myth of the infallibility of the head.
Whereas the Italians are probably not a people of creduloni, we must recognize that mussolini was an authentic virtuoso of illusionism.
but it was precisely this virtuosity that brought Italy to defeat.
fine
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maxopus
Guest
Look, I read you, even if I don't comment 
Exatem
Guest
and I would like to see that you do not read.. .Look, I read you, even if I don't comment
risks that by birth under the tree I make you find the work omnia ie, all my manuscripts in original format including those I still have to write...:tongue:
Like I told old, I know my "victims." :wink:
maxopus
Guest
his wife recovered and scanned some photos of some of his family members in uniform at the time of World War II... as soon as I can collect some info I let you know
Fulvio Romano
Guest
Look, you're not the only ones... but I'm in history and better than shut up, I wouldn't even reset the date of the French Revolution. . :redface:Look, I read you, even if I don't comment
Exatem
Guest
confident appearancehis wife recovered and scanned some photos of some of his family members in uniform at the time of World War II... as soon as I can collect some info I let you know
All right, well, you've got a lot in other fields that at least a little history leave it to me...:finger: