genoa tragedy

[numero1]

the "is still there" was not related to my wonder that there was still, it was only to state that it is still there to testify with its existence that perhaps a more secure position could be found.

if by location + safe you mean the old turret ok, but............ I explained to you, and I keep explaining:
1) because that position could not and cannot be used
2) I continue to insist that there is no other place, and that I say it with knowledge of cause
3) not only the best place is in the head of that pier, and not to another

pulling the sums as they lower it can't, and another place is not there, still take water to the ships............. as indicated here by me in my previous post:http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubb...5/21/oggi-la-torre-sarebbe-da-mettere-in.htmlI might be fine, as a competent person says it.

But then how do we put them with everything you wrote on the airport control tower?
Wouldn't it be a bit like putting the tower in the middle of a track?
So either the pilot tower is good to do it back where it was before, maybe with better protections, or.........
or if made on an artificial islet we plant it with the comparison ships/aircrafts, which does not make any sense to me.
greetings

 

[Fulvio Romano]

(cut)

Wouldn't it be a bit like putting the tower in the middle of a track?

the president says no, because the control towers are not on the trajectory of the planes. I don't understand this position, and I wish that [mi] be explained more in detail (I am now serious. Marcof doesn't understand when he's being teased, I don't want the president to be teased when he's not.
neither the pilot tower is on the course of the ships, it is only "close" to such route, as the control towers are "wiss" to those of the planes. Are the ships closer? but the ships go even more slowly. therefore to make a comparison or calculate the value of (1/2)mv^2/d (potential dissipative energy field) at the center of the respective towers, or the comparison is not possible.
and it wouldn't even make justice, because the statistical aspect is missing.

 

[Er Presidente]

philosophy is simple, an object is "out of trajectory" when in no condition the imaginary line projecting the object in motion affects the obstacle.
Now the control towers seem random but at the approaching stage, the most dangerous moment, the plane has a trajectory that never departs from the axis track.
It's the same reasoning that we accept platans at the side of a road, less curved.
the problem of the tower of genova, for me, is not in its absolute position but linked to the fact that all the ships out were forced to make a rotation of 180° right in front of the tower and not for sporadic cases, always.
So, for me, the position of the tower was dangerous, even because there were people working on it (it was not a simple lighthouse).
If that was the only position, perhaps, it remains the fact that that ship, with its technical conformation was not completely maneuverable with two only trailers and as a cable can always break even with three.
to have security or move the tower or avoid turning all the ships by opening the other outlet or, ultimately, you put 4 trailers.
Just like that, I think, you'd do the best to make the operation safe at a cost-sensitive, the two extra trailers, but you'd have to.
Another speech is the one referring to the most modern ships, even if no tugler can ever control them, they have the autonomous stubbornness to fire on themselves.
even if I remain perplexed.

 

[numero1]

the truth is that, as written + and + times, in particular by exatem the city is close to the back from hills and mountains, so the basin of the port until it has rectum everything went ok, then it started to eat space to the sea, and therefore the port has expanded progressively, has improved the instrumentation, and increased the skills etc. etc.

But... but when besides growing the size, and the number of traffics of the port, the port itself had to live with beasts always + beasts, the situation began to get warm.
and now we have probably come almost to the limit.
od the port is modernized, ergo not only with cutting-edge tools but it enlarges towards the sea, cement called brutally, or the ships return to dimensions + "human".
assuming that this second event will not be realized remains the first.
The fact of being able to open the second entrance of the port would be a great thing, but do you think if one day a plane lands on a portacontainer?
as exatem writes in post #35:
"for the configuration of the port of genova that forces the ships to access the channel of sampierdarena entering and leaving from the mouth of lever, in front of carignano. in theory there would be a second transit to the mouth of the west that is located in front of the river Polcevera (tristemente famous for the flood) but this transit is not accessible for three reasons, the bottom, the absence of an area for the maneuver and the limits imposed by the nearby airport. so if a ship enters the prora sampierdarena channel, it will have to go out in reverse and then turn in the mirror in front of the pilot tower.
not by chance the study of the new regulatory plan of the port there is the idea of making the entrance of the west agibili that would allow to enter from an ambush and exit from the other. "If an airplane landing lands on a net portacontainer, you'd read like this.
"That's what I said!!!!! it was not necessary to make accessible the other entrance from the port"
and another one says:
"What was needed to move the airport" or etc.

the examples you can do yourself......... .
and a plane landing at genova went long and went off track, it already happened years and years ago.http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/genova/genova/genova.htmlgreetings

 

[Er Presidente]

the truth is that, as written + and + times, in particular by exatem the city is close to the back from hills and mountains, so the basin of the port until it has rectum everything went ok, then it started to eat space to the sea, and therefore the port has expanded progressively, has improved the instrumentation, and increased the skills etc. etc.

But... but when besides growing the size, and the number of traffics of the port, the port itself had to live with beasts always + beasts, the situation began to get warm.
and now we have probably come almost to the limit.
od the port is modernized, ergo not only with cutting-edge tools but it enlarges towards the sea, cement called brutally, or the ships return to dimensions + "human".
assuming that this second event will not be realized remains the first.
The fact of being able to open the second entrance of the port would be a great thing, but do you think if one day a plane lands on a portacontainer?
as exatem writes in post #35:
"for the configuration of the port of genova that forces the ships to access the channel of sampierdarena entering and leaving from the mouth of lever, in front of carignano. in theory there would be a second transit to the mouth of the west that is located in front of the river Polcevera (tristemente famous for the flood) but this transit is not accessible for three reasons, the bottom, the absence of an area for the maneuver and the limits imposed by the nearby airport. so if a ship enters the prora sampierdarena channel, it will have to go out in reverse and then turn in the mirror in front of the pilot tower.
not by chance the study of the new regulatory plan of the port there is the idea of making the entrance of the west agibili that would allow to enter from an ambush and exit from the other. "If an airplane landing lands on a net portacontainer, you'd read like this.
"That's what I said!!!!! it was not necessary to make accessible the other entrance from the port"
and another one says:
"What was needed to move the airport" or etc.

the examples you can do yourself......... .
and a plane landing at genova went long and went off track, it already happened years and years ago.http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/genova/genova/genova.htmlgreetings

Genoese airport is one of the most dangerous as the most dangerous one, if an accident at airports so taped you can't talk about fatality.
First you build an airport where you can't, then a port where there's no place then you fill it with huge ships making him do the boa's "giretti" and you justify everything with an interweaving of crossed impediments.
the casino is there and the poor pilots have paid with life decades of unarmed choices dictated by the spasmodic desire to grow at all costs the port, the airport, the city of genova without rules and criterion building an imbalmed logistic monster from itself.
claiming to get the ships out of that size back and then have fun to maneuver them in some kind of pool because the other channel interferes with the airport is just the example of a slender choice.
If the airport is not compatible with the port you have to decide, at the limit, to make one or another survive.
instead it never renumbers to nothing it continues to follow the eternity hoping that everything "go well".
I remain of the idea that if companies were forced to ensure employees for a substantial millionaire compensation in cases of death at work, insurance would have one meter and a very different measure in calculating insurance premiums in such cases.

 

[numero1]

in any case for the Provisional Pilot Tower we are looking for this solution:http://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2013/05/31/news/la_torre_piloti_nell_ex_nira-60074615/advantages:
1) is definitely + tall of the old tower of the 20s/30s, perhaps it is as high as the collapsed tower.
2) is by the sea with a wide view
3) while being by the sea is definitely protected, I bet to say (by memory) that there are in the order
a) the palace
b) parking
c) the natural and/or artificial cliff of protection, ergo deduces that between the point + near the palace and the sea itself there are 50 meters at least

disadvantages:
1) of a bureaucratic nature, as the palace is just outside the harbour fence, is therefore a matter of competence of the municipality and the fair agency, in fact it is located within the exhibition space of the city.
where the nautical exhibition takes place practically.
but given the situation, and the relationships that appear good between the cap and the other interested bodies I think that there should be no problem.
2) is not used for years and falls apart, and here problems begin........ who puts the minimum of money to make the building viable?
3) the position that sucks.
In fact, despite not having obstacles and a wide view, the building is located at the bottom of the exhibition area, with 2 entrances one from the square kennedy and the other from the street of the fishermen, if there is still that access.
in practice if it is a question of overseeing the channel of access to the port, what should take the wild after the manoeuvre the position is perfect, while for the rest of the port.....................
the collapsed tower was just close to the era of the "boat repairs", which are west of the pier lie, while the palace now taken as an hypothesis is + to the east.
from the top floor I have serious doubts that, despite the wide view they can control the channel of sampierdarena well, we do not talk then of the + inside of the port itself.
In short, it has a wide view, but it also has a huge dead corner, that corner corresponding to the tip of the pier lie itself.
I hope to be denied, especially on this last point, by whom as exatem knows the port and the ships better than me.
Hi.

 

[Fulvio Romano]

So safety at work is just a calculated risk?

Well, it sounds cynical, but yes. security is exactly a calculated risk, and I am not the one to say it, but the tu81, 2006/42/ce, 2006/95/ce, ohsas, etc., that is the best worldwide legislation regarding safety.

I find that a collision case in the analysis of the risks of that job, that of the pilots, was to be contemplated as possible, and what would you have written as a security officer? "It never happened"?

statistical inference is normally used in risk assessments. even if it is not the way to prefer when it is possible to make calculations of different nature.

Unfortunately I realize that for those who are not of the profession (although I do not think you can be considered "not of the profession") the concepts of residual risk and risk analysis can be seen as sterile accounts outside the reality made by white collars to the warmth in their offices and who have no idea how things really go. Perhaps in some cases sporadic is also so, but I would like to remind you that the probability approach at risk has significantly reduced the number of dead and injured at work. This, translated, means he saved hundreds of human lives.

 

[Er Presidente]

Well, it sounds cynical, but yes. security is exactly a calculated risk, and I am not the one to say it, but the tu81, 2006/42/ce, 2006/95/ce, ohsas, etc., that is the best worldwide legislation regarding safety.

statistical inference is normally used in risk assessments. even if it is not the way to prefer when it is possible to make calculations of different nature.

Unfortunately I realize that for those who are not of the profession (although I do not think you can be considered "not of the profession") the concepts of residual risk and risk analysis can be seen as sterile accounts outside the reality made by white collars to the warmth in their offices and who have no idea how things really go. Perhaps in some cases sporadic is also so, but I would like to remind you that the probability approach at risk has significantly reduced the number of dead and injured at work. This, translated, means he saved hundreds of human lives.

I agree on the whole line, but consider "zero" or near zero the risk of collision inside a port, finds me puzzled, say.
In my opinion, with the right numbers, the risk was there and it was necessary to use better to avoid it.

 

[numero1]

Genoese airport is one of the most dangerous as the most dangerous one, if an accident at airports so taped you can't talk about fatality.
First you build an airport where you can't, then a port where there's no place then you fill it with huge ships making him do the boa's "giretti" and you justify everything with an interweaving of crossed impediments.
the casino is there and the poor pilots have paid with life decades of unarmed choices dictated by the spasmodic desire to grow at all costs the port, the airport, the city of genova without rules and criterion building an imbalmed logistic monster from itself.
claiming to get the ships out of that size back and then have fun to maneuver them in some kind of pool because the other channel interferes with the airport is just the example of a slender choice.
If the airport is not compatible with the port you have to decide, at the limit, to make one or another survive.
instead it never renumbers to nothing it continues to follow the eternity hoping that everything "go well".
I remain of the idea that if companies were forced to ensure employees for a substantial millionaire compensation in cases of death at work, insurance would have one meter and a very different measure in calculating insurance premiums in such cases.

leaving the topic air......... since we said not to mention +
well leaving this, the port of genova how many years it is 1000 ? 2000 ? since already in the time of the Romans etc. etc.
the gulf of genova is a natural inlet suitable for a port, and so it has been used over the centuries, then the city that presses behind, the change of the size of the ships, the increase of the traffics, and perhaps also the wrong choices made over the last 50 years, put it all, but accidents.
the port is a living structure, and as such must be respected and grown, now as I have already written we have probably reached the limit.
We hope that there will be a rule in this regard.
the fact of doing that maneuver here was and is considered routine, no harbour or not, has criticized the maneuver as such.
the utopia of a perfect port is something that you can only dream about, maybe we did it, and few others.
try to build a new port, everything goes well, then after 100 years the ships became triple before, and you had to preview it?
but as you can reason like that.
It is not possible to predict 100 per 100, and when we cannot try to make the right decisions at the right time, which in this case is only one, to enlarge the dock of the port, so that a tomorrow that maneuver is not + necessary.
It's just one because of course you can't destroy the city behind your back.
As far as the insurance speech is concerned, I might also agree.

 

[gerod]

estimating a risk (called an assessment) means defining the probability that a given combination of factors determine a harm.
Unfortunately it is not always possible to define all combinations of factors even if it is reasonably predictable to think that a ship can go to slam against the dock (I hope not to have wrong term) and, if near there is a tower, it is possible that this event may also affect the same tower. will also be a rare event but we must always consider that the weight of the damage is high! Just once and do serious damage.
It is equally obvious that it is not easy to assess everything but some evaluation could be made.
are however evaluations with the hindsight, too easy to evaluate back.
the estimate of the risks must be made before, not after: after we estimate the damage, unfortunately;(

 

[Fulvio Romano]

what Gerod writes is absolutely right. We try to make an account with the en iso 13849 is that is not an applicable rule in this case, but since it's what I can use, at least it can give us a spannometric indication.
Moreover it is worth noting that the calculations that follow are related to an incident happened, and that is not how this norm is used.

This rule is used in the industrial field to calculate the reliability (the so-called performance level) of safety systems so that the risk for those who use the machinery is under a certain threshold. Not zero. already here it might seem strange that you do not always and anyway the maximum to safeguard those who work with a machine, but to think well install a double-channel spraying at the kitchen door when the mom uses the blender (which has blades and therefore is dangerous) is actually exaggerated. so no, you do not use all the available technology, but only the necessary one.

five performance levels are defined for security systems. Then we calculate the risk of a certain function (risk that depends on the frequency of exposure, the damage you can have, etc.) and it is decided that pl should have the security relative to that function.

to make it short, normally in the industrial field you get to a maximum pld (the fourth level). the fifth level, or ple is used only when the damage is extended, such as the release of toxic clouds in urban areas, nuclear explosions, etc.

if one could calculate that such an accident occurs every 16 years (but it is not so, as we will see later), according to the en iso 13849, the safety function "avoid that a ship lowers the pilot tower" was realized in plb (a dangerous fault every 11 - 340 years).

considering the frequency of exposure (24h) and the possible damage (death), it was carried out at least in pld (a dangerous fault every 100-1000 years). So, with the hymn of then there is a lot of distance between how much "is" and how much "it should be".

In fact, however, we must consider that the tower was built 16 years ago, but this does not mean much. It should be seen when it was the last time such an impact occurred at that point, perhaps without an echo mediation because the tower was not there yet (dangerous result that did not lead to an accident). if it happened before 1913 it means that despite the incident, the tower was to be called "safe".
Since, however, extending until 1913 means changing the traffic scenario a lot, it could extend the calculation to several similar impact points for manoeuvre difficulties, and then divide by the number of points. in this way we can reduce the temporal extension of the phenomenon. who knows if exatem or number1 want to try to propose some point.

I admit it. but I said that in this case it is not applicable.

 

[gerod]

to me it would seem, my personal opinion, that the risk of collision with the structure of the tower was to be contemplated in possible events if not even likely, but these are personal opinions and therefore devoid of any foundation.

I agree!

@fulvio
as you say 13849-1 (and 2) is not applicable for risk assessment. However, it may be applicable to ship safety systems unless there are other similar rules in the shipyard (the state of art should be 13849). and if the impact scenario is applicable against something with loss of human lives becomes fundamental.

by the workers aspect, an estimate could be
r = p x g
r is the risk
p is the probability of this happening (from 1 to 4)
g is gravity (from 1 to 4)

with this formula however the probability weighs as much as gravity. I, usually use r = p x g^2 to give more weight to the damage.
If g = 4 (death) and p = 1 (improbable) value 16 becomes unacceptable and therefore must work on the damage or on the effects that may arise from this event.
in case of earthquake it is not that you can do so: but you can design structures of a certain type to limit the damage!

said this, the assessment or estimate of the risk is very subjective and therefore what to me is rare for another could be on average possible ....
I recently use a method mentioned in iso 14121-2 which is used in use.

I repeat, the important thing is that what jumps out of the vdr is as close as possible to reality: It's not easy to predict such events but if you put yourself at the table and there's a lot of reasons maybe something interesting comes up.

 

[numero1]

what Gerod writes is absolutely right. We try to make an account with the en iso 13849 is that is not an applicable rule in this case, but since it's what I can use, at least it can give us a spannometric indication.
Moreover it is worth noting that the calculations that follow are related to an incident happened, and that is not how this norm is used.

This rule is used in the industrial field to calculate the reliability (the so-called performance level) of safety systems so that the risk for those who use the machinery is under a certain threshold. Not zero. already here it might seem strange that you do not always and anyway the maximum to safeguard those who work with a machine, but to think well install a double-channel spraying at the kitchen door when the mom uses the blender (which has blades and therefore is dangerous) is actually exaggerated. so no, you do not use all the available technology, but only the necessary one.

five performance levels are defined for security systems. Then we calculate the risk of a certain function (risk that depends on the frequency of exposure, the damage you can have, etc.) and it is decided that pl should have the security relative to that function.

to make it short, normally in the industrial field you get to a maximum pld (the fourth level). the fifth level, or ple is used only when the damage is extended, such as the release of toxic clouds in urban areas, nuclear explosions, etc.

if one could calculate that such an accident occurs every 16 years (but it is not so, as we will see later), according to the en iso 13849, the safety function "avoid that a ship lowers the pilot tower" was realized in plb (a dangerous fault every 11 - 340 years).

considering the frequency of exposure (24h) and the possible damage (death), it was carried out at least in pld (a dangerous fault every 100-1000 years). So, with the hymn of then there is a lot of distance between how much "is" and how much "it should be".

In fact, however, we must consider that the tower was built 16 years ago, but this does not mean much. It should be seen when it was the last time such an impact occurred at that point, perhaps without an echo mediation because the tower was not there yet (dangerous result that did not lead to an accident). if it happened before 1913 it means that despite the incident, the tower was to be called "safe".
Since, however, extending until 1913 means changing the traffic scenario a lot, it could extend the calculation to several similar impact points for manoeuvre difficulties, and then divide by the number of points. in this way we can reduce the temporal extension of the phenomenon. who knows if exatem or number1 want to try to propose some point.

I admit it. but I said that in this case it is not applicable.

Mah... between ship and ship there have been impacts, I give it to you for certain, but without serious consequences and kept hidden.
They agreed to the shipowners and/or insurance companies, but I don't think of anything that ended up in the newspapers.
As well as I can't think of anything about an impact right at that point of the tower, at least as much as I remember.
the incident + grave I remember is a car that coming down from a ferry has mistakenly maneuvered and ended from the landing ramp directly in the water.
dead all occupants this few years ago...... At least I seem to remember like that.
the only thing that comes to mind was the impact documented and that certainly will be on the net between a transatlantic beast and the bridgehead of the thousand, therefore another point of the port.
the head, in granite, was half crushed and the ship suffered damage, I don't remember how serious.
no harm to people.
Hi.

 

[numero1]

Here he is.http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubb.../2001/07/30/la-victoria-picchia-sul-molo.htmlIt wasn't exactly a thousand bridge, that was the destination, the dock.
He hit on the head of the so-called cotton warehouses, I don't remember the exact name of that dock, maybe it has now become part of "luigi durand de la penne".
to note that the beast should have been around 180° but instead in this case did not do it and did pum anyway.
Hi.

 

[Er Presidente]

I agree!

@fulvio
as you say 13849-1 (and 2) is not applicable for risk assessment. However, it may be applicable to ship safety systems unless there are other similar rules in the shipyard (the state of art should be 13849). and if the impact scenario is applicable against something with loss of human lives becomes fundamental.

by the workers aspect, an estimate could be
r = p x g
r is the risk
p is the probability of this happening (from 1 to 4)
g is gravity (from 1 to 4)

with this formula however the probability weighs as much as gravity. I, usually use r = p x g^2 to give more weight to the damage.
If g = 4 (death) and p = 1 (improbable) value 16 becomes unacceptable and therefore must work on the damage or on the effects that may arise from this event.
in case of earthquake it is not that you can do so: but you can design structures of a certain type to limit the damage!

said this, the assessment or estimate of the risk is very subjective and therefore what to me is rare for another could be on average possible ....
I recently use a method mentioned in iso 14121-2 which is used in use.

I repeat, the important thing is that what jumps out of the vdr is as close as possible to reality: It's not easy to predict such events but if you put yourself at the table and there's a lot of reasons maybe something interesting comes up.

It seems that in 1999 there was a similar accident in the same place, but then the tower was not there.

 

[Exatem]

It seems that in 1999 there was a similar accident in the same place, but then the tower was not there.

the tower had been inaugurated in 1997 (on the net there are numerous confirmations).

the question is not whether the tower had to be there or not. The fact is that there was and a ship, for some reason to define, it ended on us. the choice of the place where to erect such construction is a decision dating back to 30 years ago, called by the same harbour operators, with different traffic conditions and with different ships, in a port, that to the current state, denounces a conformation almost "difficult".
I said it and repeated it several times but it seems that the message was not taken by everyone and here I made the mistake of persevering.
the question, to remain in the technical field, is whether the ship has had an avary, if yes of what kind, because it has happened, what can be done to avoid the repeating of such events.

 

[Er Presidente]

the tower had been inaugurated in 1997 (on the net there are numerous confirmations).

the question is not whether the tower had to be there or not. The fact is that there was and a ship, for some reason to define, it ended on us. the choice of the place where to erect such construction is a decision dating back to 30 years ago, called by the same harbour operators, with different traffic conditions and with different ships, in a port, that to the current state, denounces a conformation almost "difficult".
I said it and repeated it several times but it seems that the message was not taken by everyone and here I made the mistake of persevering.
the question, to remain in the technical field, is whether the ship has had an avary, if yes of what kind, because it has happened, what can be done to avoid the repeating of such events.

It seems to me a restrictive interpretation of the problem, but if so, then I can only imagine what happened today.http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubr...varia-la-jolly-verde-rimorchiata_8805354.html

 

[Er Presidente]

other precedents that, in my opinion, can only make similar accidents likely.

"genova – it was a cold morning of February, due to the accuracy of 5 in the morning of 19 February 2006, when at the Gadda descent, not far from the pier lie theater of the tragedy last night, when the unthinkable happened. a portacontainer of 42 thousand tons, 242 meters long, “tampona” a ferry, that in turn ends with the hatch against the wall of a barn wire shed, and lowers it. an incredible coincidence, but also a perfect miracle: on the pier there are twenty-five acetylene cylinders, which are hardly involved in the impact.ends with a lot of fear, but without injuries, the collision between henry hudson bridge Japanese and the island ferry of Sardinian lloyd pearls. tells us, however, that the traffic inside the dam can be a forum for serious disasters even on the ground when the devil puts the paw. “a very normal accident – commented the dean of the pilots of genova, cravings draft – so much so that the ships have reported only a few bruises”. but in the dock it could be a disaster.There are other precedents. there is still a wildcard of the Mexican fleet, jolly verde, in the annals of the harbour accidents to genova. on 16 October 2002, the ship portacontainer from 30 thousand tons long almost 200 meters, spur bridge libia and lowers a high pacheco crane over 40 meters. It would have been another tragedy.a year later, the 2 September 2003, il traghetto by Jane of the Tyrrhenian, with 2,400 passengers on board, hit a frangiflutti brush at the top of the Andrea Doria bridge and move almost half a meter the concrete blocks of the pier. No wounded, very scary. "

an electric or energetic blackout is always possible on a ship, an event with which you have to deal with.

 

[Cristallo]

the choice of the place where to erect such construction is a decision dating back to 30 years ago, called by the same harbour operators, with different traffic conditions and with different ships, in a port, that to the current state, denounces a conformation almost "difficult".

the question, to remain in the technical field, is whether the ship has had an avary, if yes of what kind, because it has happened, what can be done to avoid the repeating of such events.

how not to quote, with carpiato screwing on the right.:smile:
synthetic and efficient. . (cut)

 

[Er Presidente]

the tower had been inaugurated in 1997 (on the net there are numerous confirmations).

the question is not whether the tower had to be there or not. The fact is that there was and a ship, for some reason to define, it ended on us. the choice of the place where to erect such construction is a decision dating back to 30 years ago, called by the same harbour operators, with different traffic conditions and with different ships, in a port, that to the current state, denounces a conformation almost "difficult".
I said it and repeated it several times but it seems that the message was not taken by everyone and here I made the mistake of persevering.
the question, to remain in the technical field, is whether the ship has had an avary, if yes of what kind, because it has happened, what can be done to avoid the repeating of such events.

I allow myself to disagree with this approach. Technically, it is relevant to me, even the location of the tower and its protection from accidental impacts.
the fact that it has been there for 30 years does not justify its position, the fact that the position has been asked by the operators is still less important, I do not feel that security must respond to the demands of the quota operators.
the fact, fundamental, that the port is not adapted to the new realities and certainly true but is not ineluctable, it would be enough to act accordingly.
I would just like to point out that the ship was not new and that ships of that size already existed at the time of the project of the tower, so the problem could be obvious even then.
It is clear that in the face of such distant positions it has been forced to argue in a repeated and thorough way but, personally, it seems to me that this is the purpose of a forum, exchange opinions and information.